



Office of the State Comptroller  
Annual Report 70C | 2021

## **National-Strategic Spheres of Activity**

# **Preparedness to Defend Essential Facilities against Missiles, Rockets and Other Aerial Threats**

Abstract





# Preparedness to Defend Essential Facilities against Missiles, Rockets and Other Aerial Threats

## Background

The State of Israel is subject to severe and extensive aerial threat, such as missiles and rockets, and it must be appropriately prepared to defend its essential facilities against such threat.

## Key facts

### Several hundreds of thousands

is the estimated number of aerial threats that can be expected from the enemy in 2020

**21,000**

rockets and mortar shells were fired from the Gaza Strip into Israel from September 2000 to September 2019

### Several dozen

Facilities designated for physical protection are included in the list issued to the National Emergency Management Authority.

### Very few

Facilities have been physically protected out of the list of essential facilities approved by the interministerial committee. Physical protection is also planned for additional facilities. Not one facility of specific bodies is among the aforesaid facilities.





## Audit actions

- From September 2017 until April 2019, alternately, the Office of the State Comptroller examined the nature of the preparedness of, inter alia, the Ministry of Defense and the IDF for mapping essential facilities and infrastructures in specific bodies and for protecting them against the aerial threat. The audit was conducted in the Ministry of Defense, in the IDF, in the National Emergency Management Authority, in the National Security Council and in additional bodies.
- The subcommittee of the Knesset State Control Committee decided not to submit to the Knesset and not to publish parts of this report for national security reasons, pursuant to section 17 of the State Comptroller Law, 1958 [Consolidated Version]. The classification of these parts does not prevent the understanding of the fundamental issues raised in this audit

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## key findings

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-  **The national infrastructures essential for protection:** failing to implement the May 2011 interministerial committee's decision to prepare the home front for emergencies, the National Emergency Management Authority has not yet submitted a proposed resolution to the interministerial committees<sup>1</sup> regarding the essential facilities. Furthermore, the National Security Council has not proposed to the Prime Minister to discuss in the interministerial committee meetings (today, the State Security Cabinet) the existence and nature of activities by the relevant authorities to protect essential infrastructures in specific bodies.
-  **Promotion of the legislation of the "Home Front Law" for management of the home front during emergencies:** in February 2011, the Ministry of Defense distributed a draft bill in this regard and the last memorandum draft bill in this regard was distributed in June 2016.<sup>2</sup> The Ministry of Defense submitted an updated draft bill to the Ministry of Justice only in July 2018, after it received comments from various government ministries.<sup>3</sup> The legislation has not yet been completed.
-  **Deficient activity of the Ministry of Defense to advance the protection of essential infrastructures:** the Ministry of Defense has not taken action to provide physical protection to essential infrastructures in specific bodies; it has no work plan for providing protection, if needed; and it failed to prepare a threat scenario<sup>4</sup> for these bodies .
-  **Deficient preparedness of specific bodies for protecting their essential facilities against aerial threats:** one specific body is partially prepared in this regard, and the protection of its facilities is incomplete; another body has been prepared according to the threats in the reviews that it conducted in 2008, 2013 and 2014, although it is doubtful that they adequately reflect the range of threats. Various gaps that were discovered in the reviews and examinations have not been handled.

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1 The interministerial committee for preparing the home front for emergencies and the interministerial committee for national security affairs (the State Security Cabinet).

2 The memorandum includes a draft of the bill.

3 The forwarding of the draft bill to the Ministry of Justice by the Ministry of Defense does not constitute confirmation that its version is acceptable to the other relevant government ministries.

4 The threat scenario is the potential war scenario used to derive the force-building goals and the strategic planning and it constitutes a baseline for preparedness and for the formulation of strategies for contending with the threats appearing in the determined threat.







In 2019, the Ministry of Defense performed strategic work to map essential facilities in specific bodies.

During the audit in October 2017, one specific body decided to prepare a “survival” plan designed to ensure functional continuity. In December 2019, the body announced that it had completed the strategic work in this regard.

In 2019, another body began a quantitative analysis to define the risk posed to it considering the aerial threats and the costs involved. In December 2019, that body notified the Office of the State Comptroller that it had completed this analysis.

## Key recommendations

-  The National Emergency Management Authority should prepare a draft resolution, as is required pursuant to the interministerial committee’s decision of May 2011 to prepare the home front for emergencies, and a list of essential facilities that their protection is required, and should submit these documents to the State Security Cabinet or to the government. It is recommended that the National Security Council should propose to the Prime Minister to place on the agenda of the State Security Cabinet a discussion of the issue of the relevant authorities’ preparations to provide passive defense solutions for vital infrastructures in specific entities.
-  The Ministry of Defense should promptly complete the strategic work on the subject of essential infrastructures in specific bodies, should validate it from time to time considering the changing threats and should formulate a multiyear work plan that is supported by a defense budget.
-  The Ministry of Defense should take prompt action to formulate a threat scenario for specific bodies and should bring it to their attention.
-  One specific body should continue working in coordination with the Ministry of Defense to augment its functional continuity. Furthermore, another body should continue performing updated strategic work regarding the implications of the impact of aerial threats to its facilities on its operations, and regarding the measures needed to mitigate the expected damages.

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## Summary

The audit found deficiencies in the activity of the Ministry of Defense, the IDF, the National Emergency Management Authority, the National Security Council and of other relevant bodies – each within its own purview – on the subject of protecting essential infrastructures and facilities in specific bodies. The Ministry of Defense should prepare a work plan for protecting the mentioned essential facilities and should examine the sources for funding it.

