



State Comptroller | Special Audit Report – Mixed Cities | 2022

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# **Policing and Law Enforcement in Mixed Cities During the Guardian of the Walls Operation Events and in Routine**





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### Background

The Israel Police is charged with enforcing the law, maintaining public order, protecting people's and property's safety, and internal security. The Israel Security Agency is charged with maintaining the state's security, the rules of a democratic regime, and its institutions. In May 2021, during Operation 'Guardian of the Walls, high-intensity and large-scale violent incidents and aggressive riots erupted throughout Israel. In the course of these incidents, three civilians were killed, and hundreds were injured (including 306 police officers) in about 520 documented incidents, at the height of which, according to the assessment of authorized security officials, participated about 6,000 Israeli Arab residents. About 3,200 were arrested, about 240 were Jews. The total financial cost is estimated at NIS 48 million of damages to civilian property and about NIS 10 million to police property. These events illustrated the challenges of protecting personal safety and ensuring public order in mixed cities. They highlighted the need to examine policing and law enforcement in these communities. It should be noted that this audit does not detract from the appreciation and gratitude for the work of the law enforcement bodies, led by the Police, who work day and night to ensure public order in both routine and emergency times.



### Key Figures

**about  
1,970,000**

residents live in mixed cities

**0**

the number of police files classified on nationalist grounds in 2018–2020 at the Lod, Jaffa, and Acre stations

**about  
520**

the number of riot hotspots during the Guardian of the Walls

**48**

the number of suspects out of 90 following the arrest of 276 from the mixed cities of Acre, Jaffa, and Lod were prosecuted for crimes of terrorism, racism, and terrorism on racial grounds<sup>1</sup>

**0**

police officers of Border Police Patrol Units<sup>2</sup> stationed in the Shfela (lowlands) District on Jerusalem Day, May 10, 2021 (when Operation Guardian of the Walls was launched)

**about  
2,836**

calls to the Central District hotline were not answered during the height of the events on May 11 to 13, 2021

**about  
60%**

of the Border Police reserve units recruited before and during the Guardian of the Walls were not allocated equipment

**about  
18%**


out of all those detained (about 3,200) following the Guardian of the Walls were prosecuted

<sup>1</sup> 24 (27%) of the suspects were prosecuted for offenses of terrorism; 14 (16%) were prosecuted for crimes on racism grounds; 10 (11%) were prosecuted for a terrorist offense on racism grounds.




<sup>2</sup> The purpose of patrol units of the Border Police is to serve as an organic force to fulfill various unique and dedicated operational tasks, during routine and emergency times, mainly in terrorism and rioting.








## Audit Actions

 From June to December 2021, the State Comptroller's Office examined policing and law enforcement in mixed cities. The audit examined the Police activity during the Guardian of the Walls events (in intelligence, operational and logistical aspects); the training and exercises for dealing with incidents of disorderly conduct; The interface between the Police and the Israel Security Agency in responsibility for intelligence in public order; The actions of the Police and prosecution bodies in making arrests, exhausting investigations, and prosecution during and regarding the Guardian of the Walls events; Policing and law enforcement in mixed cities in routine times. The examination was conducted in three mixed cities (Lod, Jaffa, and Acre), in the Police National Headquarters, in the Border Police, and regional units of the Police. Completion examinations were conducted at the Ministry of National Security, the National Security Council at the Prime Minister's Office, the Israel Security Agency, the Ministry of Justice, the Tax Authority, and the State Attorney's Office. Meetings were held with Lod, Jaffa, and Acre residents and the Abraham Initiatives Association representatives.

## Key Findings

-  **Classification of Police Stations as Mixed Stations** – the Police classify police stations as Jewish stations, Arab stations, and mixed stations. It was found that although the Police distinguished between Jewish police stations and mixed stations, in practice, no meanings were derived to positions and resources for the stations according to their classification. However, mixed stations must respond to challenges and tasks differently than Jewish stations. The lacking response to the building of the force was reflected during the Guardian of the Walls events in May 2021.
-  **Handling Crimes on Nationalist Grounds** – in 2018–2020, police stations in mixed cities did not classify cases on nationalist grounds and, as a result, did not handle cases in their nationalist context. This is while police summaries indicate that the Police are required to handle cases of this nature.
-  **The Manpower in Mixed Stations** – the manpower in the police stations in Lod and Jaffa was lacking in 2018–2021 (9.8% on average in Jaffa and 11.5% in Lod). In 2021, about half of the unmanned positions at these stations were designated for patrol duties (7 in Jaffa and 8 in Lod). The disparity in the staffing of positions at the stations, in general, and patrol positions, in particular, has operational implications that may affect their ability to perform all the tasks assigned to them and the quality of the response given to the public.



-  **Operating Model** – Police activity in mixed cities relies largely on reinforcements, the extensive action of the mission-based command centers, police officers who are temporarily assigned to these stations, MPSs<sup>3</sup>, and volunteers. There is a shortage of police officers for the full manning of police squad vehicles. For example, in February 2021, a sample check of the operation of squad vehicles was carried out at the police stations in Lod, Acre, and Jaffa. This check raised that the three stations have a shortage of entire teams consisting of two standing service police officers in squad vehicles: the Lod station was short 42 police officers (29%), and the Jaffa station was short 29 police officers (11%) and in total there is a shortage of 71 police officers. It was also raised that among the teams working at the stations, about 74% on average are teams defined as "lacking," meaning that the team in the squad vehicle consists of a standing service police officer and an MPS police officer or a volunteer.
-  **Mastery of the Arabic Language at Mixed Stations** – at the audit time, it was found that three intelligence coordinators from the Lod station, four from the Jaffa station, and three from the Acre station did not speak Arabic. It was also raised that nine intelligence coordinators from the three stations were not enrolled in the Arabic language training courses. This may directly affect their ability to optimally perform their duties since about a third of the residents in these cities are of the Arab population, and in any event, a significant part of the intelligence information will be in Arabic. Hence, not knowing the language can lead to a deficient intelligence situation report.
-  **The Police Stations in Mixed Cities – the State of Buildings** – despite the Police's decisions to build a new police station in Lod, the planning and construction procedures for the station (including the emergency command center) have been delayed for over 17 years, and are not expected to begin before 2025.
-  **Multiple Riot Sites Included in the Reference Threats and its Scenarios** – the Police were aware of the possibility of eruption of serious riots similar to those in the Guardian of the Walls events. It even detailed this threat and included it in its operational plans. The Police were supposed to be prepared for this threat and appropriately fulfill their responsibilities, according to the reference scenarios and the basic assumptions realized at the Guardian of the Walls events.
-  **The Police's Contending with the Guardian of the Walls Events** – in many instances, especially in the first days of the events, the Police did not give the necessary operational response to the threat that it defined, especially not in relevant time frames. The disparities in the Police response were reflected, among other things, in the failure to respond to residents' inquiries to the hotline. Until the return to routine, hundreds of

<sup>3</sup> Mandatory police service. Placement of conscript soldiers in agencies under the Israel Police.



incidents were documented in which 3 civilians were killed, hundreds of people were injured, and heavy property damage was caused.



**The Police Intelligence During the Guardian of the Walls Events** – during the Guardian of the Walls events, significant functional deficiencies were found in the Police intelligence array, in its responsibility for providing warnings about the events; In the forming of an intelligence situation report before and during the events; In the flow of relevant information enabling effective dealing with them. Building of the intelligence force and its operation deficiencies harmed the Police's preparedness and ability to contend with the incidents. The Police intelligence array did not present a significant forecast of the events that erupted outside of Jerusalem, in general, and in mixed cities. Police attention was directed mainly to handle events in Jerusalem. Even after the incidents began, there were still significant deficiencies in intelligence and information and substantial disparities in the transfer of intelligence to field units. An intelligence situation report, to be presented to the relevant ranks and assist them in making decisions and optimally dealing with the events, both at the national level and in an overall view, and at the regional-local levels and in tactical aspects, has not been formulated.



#### **Open-Source Intelligence and Online Monitoring –**

- (a) A key system for extracting open-source intelligence from social media was installed in the police systems in 2018, deployed in national units and districts, and used in the Investigations and Intelligence Division. The system was provided by a company engaged under an exemption from a tender. During the engagement period, the Police intended to purchase another system to provide a broader response to the collection of open-source information. Therefore, the Police did not publish a tender to purchase a system to collect data from social media only. Eventually, due to budgetary differences, the Police did not purchase the extended system. On June 8, 2020, a request was discussed to extend the contract by another two years until the publication of a tender. In the discussion on the subject on June 22, 2020, legal difficulties arose regarding requesting an exemption from a tender. The Acting Commissioner disapproved the request for an additional exemption procedure, and the system ended its operations on July 1, 2020.

Consequently, for over ten months, from July 1, 2020, until the Guardian of the Walls events in May 2021 – since tender procedures were not completed and no solution was arranged to ensure functional continuity – a key system for generating open-source intelligence did not operate. The system was installed again only at the end of the Guardian of the Walls events.

- (b) With the outbreak of the events, the Police's collection capacity in open-source intelligence was based mainly on manual collection. It was limited in the scope of



information, locating sources, and understanding online connections. The Police did not have full capabilities for monitoring online information needed to detect threats. Thus, the ability of Police intelligence to warn of the events and to provide relevant intelligence during their occurrence was severely harmed.



**Intelligence Research and Assessment of Public Order and Intelligence Assessment in an Emergency** – in the Police intelligence array, no body is engaged in in-depth research on public order. Hence, the research and assessment of public order is not handled orderly. Moreover, no central complex was established for analyzing and assessing intelligence in an emergency. Without a dedicated framework, the Intelligence Division's ability to evaluate and predict events and manage the intelligence situation report in a multiple-site events were diminished. Hence, intelligence products were insufficient, and it was fundamentally challenging to formulate an overall intelligence situation report to warn and assist in preparation for emergency scenarios and contending with them.



**Resources Based Intelligence on Public Order** – the Police did not operate a collection system focusing on public order. The Police did not assign intelligence coordinators to the extent required to contend with public order, in general, and in the mixed cities, in particular; It did not act in the necessary scope to locate sources and employ them; It did not prepare sources for collecting information on public order; It did not map nor mark extreme factors that could create and increase illegal activity of public order.



**Professional Intelligence Array Personnel** – in the Police intelligence array, there is a shortage of skilled and professional personnel on open-source intelligence, in general, and personnel who master the Arabic language, in particular. This may affect the ability to contend with public order crimes committed in the Arab sector and the mixed cities and the Police's ability to provide a reliable intelligence situation report.



**Intelligence on Public Order – the Interface Between the Police and the Israel Security Agency (ISA)** – by a government resolution from 2004<sup>4</sup>, "the responsibility for gathering and assessing intelligence on public order on nationalist grounds will rest with ISA... while the responsibility for gathering and assessing intelligence on public order, not on nationalist grounds, will reside with the Israel Police". Moreover, the Police and ISA should jointly formulate a relevant procedure. In July 2004, a cooperation procedure was signed between the Police and the Israel Security Agency, dealing, among other things, with the division of responsibilities between ISA and the Police regarding intelligence collection and assessment of the public order. During the audit, an additional

<sup>4</sup> Approved after the adoption of the Or committee recommendations – State Commission of Inquiry to examine clashes between Israeli security forces and Israeli civilians in October 2000





but unsigned version of the joint procedure was found at the Police, written in 2016–2018. The audit raised that –

- (a) The relevant factors in the Police and ISA were not familiar with the written procedures on the division of responsibilities between them on intelligence collection and assessment on public order – neither with the joint procedure from 2004 nor with the second version from 2016–2018, and mainly not with the cooperation regulation and the boundaries of the responsibilities between the organizations, especially the division of intelligence responsibilities.
- (b) Factual discrepancies in the Police and ISA references to the joint procedure highlight the need to formulate and validate an updated procedure. Thus, the procedure, completely unfamiliar and unknown to the commanding officers in the Police and ISA, did not help to fill in the fundamental absence over the years and during the Guardian of the Walls events.
- (c) Currently, the division of public order intelligence responsibilities and the interfaces between them are not conducted according to a written and approved procedure nor anchored in an orderly and binding work concept.



**The Interface Between Criminal and Nationalist-Security Events** – over the years, the intersecting topics or the overlap between criminal and nationalist-security incidents have not been defined, nor have boundaries of jurisdiction and areas of responsibility between the Police and ISA been drawn in this context.


By the Israel Security Agency's position criminal incidents should be separated from nationalist ones and dealt exclusively by the Police's. The Guardian of the Walls events indicated that this position did not address the complexity arising from the interface between the criminal and the nationalist spheres, and it was implemented without addressing the government's resolution from 2004 requiring regulation of the interfaces between the Police and ISA in the intelligence on public order.





**The Intelligence situation report on the Eve of the Guardian of the Walls events – ISA** – some months before the Guardian of the Walls, ISA identified a trend of rising tension in the Arab sector and the potential risk inherent in the possibility of an outbreak, including friction between Jews and Arabs in mixed communities. However, ISA assumed that the incidents are localized, and the main emphasis was on Jerusalem.

ISA, like the Police intelligence, did not provide a warning before the Guardian of the Walls events; Nor did it formulate an intelligence situation report of the intensity, scope, and severity of the incidents that broke out. In its activities in mixed cities during the Guardian of the Walls events, it was also raised that ISA encountered operational difficulties due to coordination problems with the Police.



 **Online Monitoring** – ISA operated in online monitoring, but deficiencies were found, especially during the Guardian of the Walls events. The Police did not have an online monitoring system. Hence, the intelligence products, all the bodies generated from online monitoring of public order were insufficient. Without regulated cooperation between ISA and the Police, the possibility of a joint effort to contend with those gaps was prevented.

 **Intelligence Gaps Contending with Guardian of the Walls events** – the intelligence gaps in dealing with disorderly conduct incidents, in general, and with Guardian of the Walls events, in particular, were created or widened in the absence of a clear arrangement of cooperation and the division of responsibilities between the Police and ISA. In intelligence as well, the Police's focused mainly on criminal challenges, while ISA focused its intelligence efforts mainly on counter terrorism and sabotage activities. Hence, public order on nationalist grounds did not receive the optimal intelligence response needed based on coordination between the ISA and the Police.

 **The Police Deployment and Control During the Guardian of the Walls Events** – the Police were not prepared to provide an adequate operational response to incidents of mass riots and violence and injury to life and property, as occurred during the Guardian of the Walls events. The allocation of forces before the incidents focused on reinforcing the Jerusalem District at the expense of other districts. The districts lacked these forces when contending with the incidents that broke out afterward and certainly in the first stages.

Thus, on May 10, 2021, reinforcements were assigned to the Jerusalem District 1,414 police officers, of which 524 were Border Police patrol unit officers, detracting from the force in the other districts. Upon the outbreak of the Guardian of the Walls events in Lod, about 57% of the Border Police patrol unit officers – a main, significant, and vital force responsible for dealing with riots – were unavailable to the Central District.

The force in Lod and Acre, when the incidents broke out, was small and unable to handle the incidents: the force in Lod on May 10, 2021, consisted of 25 police officers and was not based on organic dedicated forces trained to deal with riots; the force in Acre preparing for the demonstration on May 11, 2021 was too small, and consisted only of 58 police officers, most were neither equipped nor trained to cope with riots.

Until May 12, 2021, two days after the outbreak of the incidents and the eruption of the riots and serious incidents, the police command did not formulate a relevant situation report reflecting the scope and intensity of the incidents. Therefore, there was a delay in formulating the operational response and in deploying the forces required to deal with them.

Following the serious incidents that occurred in Lod on May 10, 2021, reinforcements were sent into the city, but it was not enough (on May 11, 2021, the police forces in Lod were comprised of about 236 police officers, including about 105 Border Police patrol



unit officers) to deal with the scope of the incidents and their intensity, especially not in the first days of their occurrence. Thus, on May 11, 2021, serious incidents occurred in Lod, and the Police failed to handle them.



**The Buildup of Forces and Recruitment of Reserves During the Guardian of the Walls events** – in the first days of the Guardian of the Walls events, when the scope and intensity of the incidents were high, the Police did not have the manpower required to deal with them.

The buildup of forces and reinforcements took several days, among other things, due to delays in the allocation of forces and the mobilization of reserves. A preliminary directive for the mobilization of reserves was already issued on May 8, 2021; After it was suspended, a request for partial reserve recruitment was issued on May 11, 2021; And an updated request leading to a complete mobilization of the Border Police reserve units was issued on May 12, 2021. However, the deployment of the reserve forces in the field was only completed on Saturday night, May 15, 2021, about a week after the initial directive and three days after the date set by the Prime Minister's directive for the beginning of their operation in the field.

The timetable in which the Police amassed and deployed the reserve forces in the field did not provide the necessary operational response. This practically negated using the reserve forces to deal with the riots when they were most needed, in the first days of the incidents, as the scope and intensity of the incidents were at their highest.



**Operation of Mission-Based Command Centers in the Guardian of the Walls Events** – the mission-based command center in Acre was established on May 12, 2021, but received responsibility for the area only on May 14, 2021, after contending with unfamiliarity with the area. The command center established in Lod was based on forces most unfamiliar with the area. Allocation of forces and activation of command centers – in the absence of prior familiarity of the commanders and forces with the area for which they receive responsibility – adversely affects the ability to fulfill the mission. The command center operated in Lod was established without being staffed, at least in the initial stages, by organic forces, and a mixture of non-organic forces characterized their amassing of forces. This adversely affected the communication between the forces and the synchronization of their activities, and as a result – in the effort concentration entrusted to the command center in dealing with the events.



**Field Data Files** – the absence of field data files at friction points in the Guardian of the Walls events harmed the forces' ability to carry out an orderly handover in the area, map sensitive locations, and prepare professionally for the tasks and challenges they faced.



**The Police Hotline Operation During the Guardian of the Walls Events** – at the height of the Guardian of the Walls events in Lod, thousands of calls from residents (about 2,836 calls between the dates of May 11 and 13, 2021) who contacted the police hotline due to a predicament they encountered or to report an incident they witnessed – did not receive any police response. Thousands of other inquiries (about 4,059 incidents), which were answered and even led to the opening of incident cases, did not receive a relevant police response. Considerable calls to the 100 Hotline were evident nationwide, and it was difficult to respond efficiently to the applicants. The 100 Hotline failed when it was required more than ever. Hence, considerable harm was caused to the citizens' sense of personal security. Therefore local organizations of residents and other factors developed, among other things, to deal with the incidents.



**Logistical Response in the Guardian of the Walls Events** – the Police was not adequately equipped for the reference scenarios it defined. Thus, according to the Police scenarios, preparations were necessary to deal with incidents that may last 20 days, but the inventories were inadequate to serve these goals.

Consequently, the Police contended with the Guardian of the Walls events with a considerable lack of means for dispersing demonstrations (the Coast District ran out of means of dispersing demonstrations already on the first day of the incidents, and the forces operating in the Central District also suffered from shortages), and with significant gaps in the supply of means of communication (for example, in the mission-based command center in Lod there was a shortage of about 20 radios) and protective equipment for the forces in the field (at the Guardian of the Walls events there was a general shortage of personal protective equipment for patrol officers, including helmets and vests. In the Central District, there was a shortage of personal protective equipment; At the Coast Border Police headquarters, there was a constant shortage of critical protective equipment; The Acre station also experienced a lack of helmets and protective suits; In the Tel Aviv District there was no protection for squad cars and patrol vehicles; And deficiencies were also found in the safety of the vehicles in the Border Police units).

Operational units were deployed in the field without being assigned vehicles appropriate to the nature of the tasks and in the number appropriate to the extent of the forces. These disparities harmed the availability of the forces, limited their capabilities, affected their performance and the ability to control and command the incidents, endangered the police officers, and caused considerable damage to the Police's operational response to the incidents.

Disparities were found in the Police's ability to control and monitor the state of the inventories and the extent of their use; It was raised that there is no standard for the measures supposed to be used by the Police in an emergency; No minimum quantities have been set for emergency stock; No "red lines" were defined beyond which equipment



will not be issued until stocks are replenished; An emergency procurement budget was not earmarked.



**Logistical Aspects in the Border Police Reserve Companies Activity** – the Police activity in emergency incidents, in general, and when multiple-site disturbances occur, in particular, relies mainly on the Border Police reserve units. In practice, these forces do not have the equipment and means allowing them to fulfill their mission.

Thus, the Police allocated equipment to only 8 of the 20 Border Police reserve companies; There is a significant shortage in the number of personal weapons available to the fighters in these units (thus, to arm Border Police reserve fighters, the Police received about 500 rifles from the IDF); There are significant disparities in the number of vehicles and means of communication used by them in their activities (thus, according to the standard, 64 vehicles should be available to 16 Border Police reserve companies, and in practice there were only 32 in the pool).



**Training and Exercises for Dealing with Riots** – recently, training for riots has decreased. Units underwent exercises less than before.

Thus, among other things, 16 command centers underwent exercises in the past in this area, however following a reorganization, there remained 5 mission-based command centers, 2 supra-command centers, and the Investigations and Intelligence Division/Lahav command undergoing exercises; Station and region commanders did not undergo training and were not familiar with the threat and the operating theory required to deal with it; The number of police officers who have undergone training in riots has decreased (in the first four months of 2021, from the beginning of the year until the outbreak of the Guardian of the Walls events, only 669 police officers, out of the total of 32,000 police officers serving in the police force, were trained to deal with rioting incidents, and throughout the entire year – only 2,601. No police officer from the Coast District stations, in general, and the Acre station, in particular, underwent this training that year. In 2020, only 2,064 police officers underwent training for dealing with riots at the Border Police's training base, compared to 2019, when 8,416 police officers underwent this training).

Starting in 2019 and for over two years, dedicated police officers from the Jaffa, Acre, and Lod stations did not undergo training on public order.

Consequently, in the Guardian of the Walls events, commanders, operational units, and reinforcements found themselves contending with serious and multiple-site incidents of riots without receiving appropriate training for this activity and without undergoing training and exercises on the subject. As a result, the Police's ability to professionally cope with the incidents and give them a proper response was affected.



**Detainees Following Operation Guardian of the Walls and Law and Order Events** – there is no uniformity in the Police data regarding the number of detainees. There is a difference of about 1,000 detainees between the figures of the Investigations Division (about 3,200) and the figures of the Research and Statistics Section (about 2,200).



**Documentation of Incidents of Riots and the Prosecution of Suspects Following the Guardian of the Walls Events** – the number of arrests and the number of indictments filed in the Guardian of the Walls incidents are relatively low compared to the scope of the violent events, their severity, characteristics and the number of participants therein.

Thus, according to the data of the Investigations Division, about 3,200 people were arrested, while indictments were filed against only about 574 suspects (18% of all those arrested). In Acre, Lod, and Jaffa, about 276 people were arrested, and indictments were filed against about 90 suspects (33%), of which 48 suspects were prosecuted for terrorism offenses (27%), for crimes motivated by racism (16%) and for a terrorism offense motivated by racism (11%). Differences were found regarding the Police's documentation capabilities, including its ability to collect photographic evidence against suspects involved in incidents of disorder. Furthermore, police stations were reinforced with investigators with no experience investigating incidents of disorder on nationalist grounds and investigators who do not speak Arabic. In the case of many suspects, insufficient evidence was collected, detainees who took part in the riots were released, and their cases were closed without indictments being filed for their participation in the riots.



**Integrated Enforcement and the Filing of Civil Lawsuits Against Suspects who Participated in Riots** – in the Guardian of the Walls events, heavy damage was caused to people and property, estimated at tens of millions of NIS. In about 880 cases, the State treasury compensated the victims at about NIS 33 million, and indictments were subsequently filed against 574 persons involved. However, in most cases, the perpetrator's identity is unknown, or it is impossible to establish a causal link between the person involved in the riots and the damage caused. According to the position of the Civil Enforcement Unit, at the audit completion, the damage that can be claimed in a civil proceeding from about 55 involved parties due to damage they caused was about NIS 4.5 million. Until the audit completion, no civil lawsuits have yet been filed for compensation for the damage caused to State property and the recovery of compensation money paid to the victims.









**The Jaffa Police Preparedness** – in Jaffa, serious incidents occurred during the Guardian of the Walls events, in which multiple riot centers developed. However, the prior preparation of the Police in Jaffa, which was more robust compared to the prior preparation in Lod and Acre, is commended.

**Training for Riots in the North District** – in 2020, the North District of the Police trained all the district's police officers to cope with rioting incidents.

## Key Recommendations






- 💡 The Prime Minister and the Minister of National Security, and through them the Israeli government, the Police, and the Israel Security Agency, should address the following deficiencies: the Police's ability to deal with complex multiple sites; Significant intelligence gaps, Delays in the recruitment of reservists and their competence; Inter-organizational interfaces; An operating model based on reinforcements.
- 💡 The Police should accompany the process of classifying the stations (as Jewish, Arab, or mixed stations), both new and existing, interpreting the derived practical significance, updating it from time to time as needed, and accordingly setting goals and allocating resources.
- 💡 It is recommended that data concerning the increased involvement in crime among the Arab society in mixed cities be analyzed and studied by the Ministry of National Security and the Police to formulate a police policy. The above data emphasizes the need for the classification of police stations in mixed cities to be reflected in decisions regarding building the police force in these cities.
- 💡 It is appropriate that the Police examine why in 2018–2020, no cases were opened on nationalist grounds at the police stations in Acre, Lod, and Jaffa. It is also appropriate to focus on monitoring operations in mixed cities for identifying actions on nationalist grounds and to consider focusing on proactive enforcement actions against crimes on nationalist ground in mixed cities. The Police should examine and analyze the extent of serious crime in the mixed cities and its characteristics for practical decisions regarding building up the police force and its operation in these cities.
- 💡 The Police should recruit additional personnel to fill the vacant positions at the Jaffa and Lod stations. Furthermore, the Police should examine the unmanned patrol positions and staff them while developing an appropriate program for recruiting and retaining the enlisting personnel.



-  The Police should examine the effectiveness of the operating model based on reinforcements and the activity of mission-based command centers in mixed cities and the positions at the stations in these cities, vis a vis the complex challenges they face in the mixed cities and the tasks they are required to perform.
-  The Police should ensure that the intelligence coordinators in the mixed cities will participate in a dedicated Arabic language course, and identify the essential roles in mixed stations where the knowledge of the Arabic language will contribute to police activity.
-  The Police should ensure that the planning procedures and the budget allocated for the construction of the new police station in Lod will enable coping with the city's challenges and the crime committed. Suppose the completion of these procedures is delayed, it is recommended to examine an alternative solution by leasing a building for the interim period until the completion of the permanent solution.
-  The intelligence array at the Police should reinforce its capabilities and increase the intelligence's data on public order in every mixed city. Strengthening the interfaces between the intelligence array, the operational units, and the National Headquarters is also recommended. This is to improve the ability to generate timely information on future incidents, to optimize the generating of intelligence during such incidents, and to assist in the flow of information – to create a situation report as a basis for an operational response to incidents.
-  By the State Comptroller's Office, it is appropriate that the Police draw lessons from the case of the shutdown of the online monitoring system regarding decision-making in engagements, when these decisions may result in the core areas of police activity being left without support or response. It is essential to find solutions to ensure functional continuity, in general, and in intelligence and operational systems in sensitive stages of implementation, in particular. Therefore, the Police should consider a delay in implementing procurement plans and prepare accordingly, especially concerning vital systems. In these cases, the Police should formulate an alternative plan if the original plan encounters difficulties. Hence, examining risk management tools would be appropriate to ensure continuity in providing the required support when an area of the police responsibility remains without a suitable permanent solution.
-  The Police should adjust its intelligence capabilities and update them at all times to meet the challenges of the digital age, including extracting information from open-sources. It is recommended to exercise the equipping plan in the open-source intelligence as soon as possible, enabling to orderly operate and without limitations. It is further recommended that the Police map all engagements with an exemption from tender ahead of time and execute tenders for equipping particularly essential intelligence systems.





-  The Intelligence Division is recommended to allocate dedicated inputs to research and assessment activities on public order. This is to establish the capabilities required to deal with threats in this area, among other things, by considering all the relevant information accumulated in the police intelligence array, in assessing the situation, and in the intelligence situation report.
-  It is recommended that the Police re-examine whether operating a central complex for the analysis and assessment of intelligence during an emergency in real-time provides a satisfactory response to the challenge of assessing intelligence in an emergency and if it is necessary to build a professional framework coordinating the topic regularly (while carrying out training, exercises and receiving professional updates under a regular plan).
-  It is appropriate that the Police characterize the manpower needs in the police intelligence array, in general, and in the open-source intelligence, in particular. In this framework, it is necessary to examine the suitability of the defined positions in the array to the number of positions needed for entire and effective operation, during routine and emergency times, including the positions that will be staffed by Arabic language speakers who have appropriate training, professionalism, and skill in intelligence. It is further appropriate to analyze the barriers to close the gaps in mastering the Arabic language, to formulate a plan dealing with these barriers, implement it and man the required positions.
-  Many incidents on criminal grounds have a direct impact on national security, personal security, and governance. Hence the essential need to define and regulate comprehensively and inclusively the cases, circumstances, and ways ISA will be employed in dealing with these incidents. This regulation may be in line with the realization of ISA's responsibility under the Israel Security Agency Law in operations that are at the core of defense and is also required under the government's resolution from 2004, given the effects of the overlap between the criminal and the nationalist spheres on national security challenges on public order. Given the above, ISA's responsibility to handle these incidents and its scope was not defined as required, and it needs clarification, decision, and regulation. It is recommended that the summary formulated by the relevant factors be submitted to the Prime Minister for approval.
-  ISA and the Police should formulate and implement an updated, validated, and integrated working procedure for cooperation between the organizations in the intelligence aspects relevant to dealing with public order incidents on a nationalist ground to maximize the capabilities of both organizations optimally coping with this challenge. An updated joint procedure should provide an orderly response to the challenges that require cooperation between the two organizations in dealing with public order incidents, in general, and vis a vis the developments of the digital age and their effects on incidents in this area. It is recommended that this procedure include a coordination mechanism between the Police and ISA to ensure that the handling of incidents where the boundaries



of responsibility are not sufficiently clear, including the responsibility for collecting intelligence on criminal targets' activities on a nationalist background, will be dealt with; And that the division of responsibilities between the organizations will be clarified and exercised in practice. It is also recommended that the Police and ISA establish regular interfaces and periodic situation assessments to deal with incidents of disorder on nationalist grounds.



The Police should conduct an in-depth examination of its options for providing an operational response to all the relevant challenges according to the reference scenarios, including coping simultaneously with several complex areas. It is recommended that the Police consider adjustments to the strategic work it carried out following the Guardian of the Walls events according to the findings and recommendations in this report and formulate an orderly plan while allocating budgets and setting timetables for its implementation. In this context, the importance of acting as soon as possible is highlighted, given the assessment that incidents such as those that occurred during Guardian of the Walls may happen again.



In this framework, along with examining the scope of the forces at its disposal and the possibility of reinforcing them, the Police should maximize its existing capabilities concerning the force in the following matters:






Maximizing the active force – locating and teaming up suitable police officers who serve in the various commands with regional standby units, who will be available for immediate activation in emergencies.

The buildup of additional forces, mobilization of reserves, and deployment of the forces – among other things, through formulating a procedure for the accelerated recruitment of the Border Police reserve companies- ensures a quick, efficient recruitment procedure based on operational considerations only. When necessary, finance the costs of recruiting the reserve units during an emergency and enable their operation without delays due to budgetary reasons. Furthermore, following the Guardian of the Walls events, the Police and the Ministry of National Security should increase the Border police forces in the reserves. It is recommended to accompany these steps with an orderly plan for the completion of the project, backed up by budgets and defined schedules.









The Police should consider the possibility that the mission-based command centers established in each district following the Guardian of the Walls events will rely on organic standby forces and a defined and permanent command structure that will undergo periodic training. It is also recommended that the Police continue to ensure the complete competence of the mission-based command centers, including by completing the procurement processes and introducing them to an orderly course of exercises and training so that, when necessary, they can be activated simultaneously in all the relevant areas.



-  It is appropriate that the Police formulate an orderly plan for forming and updating field data files for all the relevant areas, according to the police reference scenarios, including in the mixed cities. It is recommended that the field data files be computerized. It is also necessary to formulate a procedure that will ensure the transfer of the field data files in an orderly manner to reinforcement forces that will be sent to each relevant area. It is appropriate that the Police carry out audits on the matter. It is also recommended that familiarizing the commanders with the area be structured and systematic, ensuring consistent implementation over time.
-  It is appropriate that the Police prepare to ensure an orderly and comprehensive response to hotline calls in times of emergency. This framework should consider updating procedures for reinforcement – in emergencies – of hotline posts and control centers. In particular – it is appropriate to ensure that the handling of the hotline calls in an emergency will be carried out from a nationwide perspective providing an adequate response to this challenge in all the relevant districts and areas so sufficient reinforcement of the hotline's activity will be possible even in a nationwide multiple-site incident.
-  The Police should keep inventories of equipment and resources for emergencies – in the scope, variety, and quantity that will allow it to deal with threats and reference scenarios, if they materialize – and throughout the required time. The logistic management of the Border Police reserve units should be based on standardization, keys to measures and equipment, and the definition of minimum quantities of emergency inventory.
-  The Police should exhaust the measures detailed in addressing this report to complete the process of protection, equipment, and measures; Designate budgets to fill deficiencies; Manage supervision and control of the actual inventory status. In particular, it is appropriate that the Police coordinate with all the relevant factors to approve a plan filling of the gaps in measures and equipment and the allocation of the necessary budgets for its implementation, allowing for the effective operation of the forces during an emergency, in general, and of the Border Police reserve system, in particular. The plan should provide a systematic response to the equipping needs under updated reference scenarios, including budget and timetables for implementation, and define the factors responsible for its implementation. It is further appropriate that the Police complete the system for managing inventory in the organization and on the project of the emergency warehouses of the Border Police reserve forces, allocate budgets for their financing, and define timetables for their implementation and their entry into operation.
-  The Police should ensure that the Border Police Reserve units will be assigned equipment and means according to the forces' scope and purpose. This equipment and measures should be accessible to the units in an emergency immediately upon their recruitment, allowing the forces to deploy in the field and integrate into the operational activity without delay.



-  The Police should train all the police officers, units, and commanders designated to deal with disorder incidents. It should form an operating concept, build, budget, and implement organized training and exercise programs, to provide an up-to-date and professional response to the challenges the Police face, according to the threat and reference scenarios, adapted to the territorial characteristics of the relevant districts.
-  The Police should ensure that the collection of arrest data is reliably and professionally analyzed so that the enforcement policy is based on a reliable, accurate, and correct database.
-  The Police should rectify the deficiencies in the collection of documentation serving as an evidentiary basis for prosecuting those suspected of disorderly conduct. Moreover, the Police should improve its abilities in investigations of disturbances on nationalist grounds, including the use of Arabic-speaking investigators.
-  It is recommended that the Police and ISA investigate and collect evidence regarding a motive in the Counter Terrorism Law or under "hate crime" and that the State Attorney's Office use the legal tools to exhaust enforcement actions in "hate crimes" and terrorism cases.
-  The Police and the Civil Enforcement Unit at the State Attorney's Office should jointly examine the data on the extent of the damage caused to police property and the possibility of initiating civil proceedings in the appropriate cases against the perpetrators that have been located.
-  It is recommended that the State Attorney's Office formulate a deterring policy and initiate civil proceedings – especially against perpetrators of terrorist incidents and in offenses on hate and racism grounds; Promote the actions necessary to complete the investigation of those cases; And decide to file of civil lawsuits in said cases. To increase the deterrence of perpetrators, it is recommended that the Civil Enforcement Unit consider filing civil lawsuits also in cases where the identity of the perpetrators is known, and it is possible to establish a causal link between them and the damage caused but which for legal and other reasons the State Attorney's Office has decided not to conduct criminal proceedings against them, or where the accused is acquitted in the criminal proceedings.

## Photos from the riot sites – the Guardian of the Walls Events



Photo: Avishag Shaar-Yashuv, "Haaretz" ©, all rights reserved.



Photo: Joshua (Josh) Breiner, "Haaretz" ©, all rights reserved.



## Calls to the Central District hotline, May 11<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup>, 2021

Calls to the hotline	Unanswered calls	Hotline incidents	Merged incidents	Incidents closed without a police squad car
32,536	2,836	8,717	2,125	4,059

## Summary

An examination of the Guardian of the Walls events presents significant deficiencies in the Police's activities – before and during the incidents; In its preparation for multiple-site rioting incidents, in general, and in the mixed cities, in particular; And its readiness for them. Disparities were discovered in the division of responsibilities between the Police and ISA regarding intelligence on public order and the interfaces between them. This contributed to the significant intelligence gaps in dealing with the Guardian of the Walls events. Disparities were also raised in the Police's preparedness and its handling challenges of policing and law enforcement in mixed cities in routine.

These deficiencies and disparities make fighting crime complex and maintaining public order in routine times. They affix a negative starting point for contending with future incidents of disorder, should they occur. Therefore, they require thorough thinking while building up the force and its operation, in the defense array in general and the Police in particular.

In its response, the Police mentioned a series of barriers and gaps, some of which are beyond its control, which affected its preparedness for the Guardian of the Walls events and its conduct at said time, including the extent of crime in Arab society and its characteristics; Lack of legislative tools and powers in dealing with said crime; The multiplicity of tasks assigned to the Police; The burden of dealing with the challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic; The damage to the building of the police force due to the constraints of the Covid-19 period, the absence of a permanent Commissioner for about two years up to a few months before the outbreak of the incidents; And lack of a state budget.

The findings of this audit and the circumstances in which the Police operated will require the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Security and through them, the Israeli government, the Police, the Israel Security Agency, and the defense agencies as a whole to consider a series of crucial matters, as follows:

- **The Police's Ability to Deal with a Complex Multiple-Site Operations** – the Guardian of the Walls events raised the question of the Police's ability to respond to complex multiple-site incidents. In its answer, the Police stated that according to the lessons learned from the Guardian of the Walls events, plans were drawn up, actions





were taken, additional measures were being considered to close gaps and for reinforcement, and an organizational learning process was underway. Individual aspects of actions taken by the Police have been noted in this report. The complexity of the challenges, the importance of the tasks, and the findings reviewed in the report indicate that an examination of this issue is required, and mapping of plans, orders, measures, and human force; An examination of their suitability to contend with the challenges inherent in the relevant reference scenarios is also required. If the results of this examination indicate that the Police are not prepared for these, they should present it before the government for decisions making.

- **Intelligence** – for intelligence to be effective, it must flow down to the field levels. In this context, systematic work is required – to ensure a flow of information to all relevant consumers.
- **Reserve Forces** – the Guardian of the Walls events exposed considerable vulnerability of the Border Police's reserve array. If there is intent to rely on this array in dealing with internal security challenges, significant measures are required to build its strength in various areas.
- **Inter-Organizational Interfaces** – the interfaces between the various defense bodies in dealing with internal security challenges are not organized, not optimal, and do not exhaust their capabilities. This is particularly evident in the interface between the Police and ISA. A comprehensive examination of the powers of the various bodies is required; The means, equipment, and force at their disposal; The division of responsibilities between them; The determination of work procedures; And the construction of cooperation mechanisms that will ensure logical and coordinated activity in dealing with internal security challenges.
- **An Operating Model Based on Reinforcements** – when dealing with the challenges of policing and law enforcement, in general, and in mixed cities, a reinforcements model is widely used to respond to gaps. This model can serve temporarily as a relevant response in unique circumstances, not as a central long-term response. The repeated need for reinforcements raises the question of whether the capabilities assigned to the appropriate units are adequate for their challenges.

Optimal contending with the challenges of law enforcement during routine helps prevent the outbreak of violent incidents, and at least, in reducing their scope and intensity; And appropriate preparation for emergency incidents enables effective dealing with them, should they occur. Therefore, it is recommended that the Police and ISA improve their activities in mixed cities during routine times, and increase their preparation for extreme incidents, according to the reference threats and scenarios. It is also recommended that the Police and the State Attorney's Office exhaust the prosecution procedures against those involved in incidents of violation of public order motivated by racial or nationalist grounds.



This is more compelling given the authorized entities' concern, highly likely to materialize, of a renewed irruption of violent incidents in mixed cities. I.e., the Guardian of the Walls events is not a passing event, the tensions between the populations have not dissipated, and the irruption of violence may resume.

It should be noted that the significant deficiencies and gaps raised in this audit do not diminish the appreciation for the dedication of the Israel Police officers and commanders, Border Police troops and commanders, and members of the Israel Security Agency working under challenging conditions involving risks and self-sacrifice to prevent human and property damage and enforce the law. In this context, we mention some of the challenges that the Police have faced in the last two years, other than the Guardian of the Walls events, including challenges related to the Covid-19 pandemic; The Mt. Meron disaster; The fight against criminal organizations; Aspects of governance in the Negev; Crime in the Arab sector; Incidents in East Jerusalem and the Temple Mount. This accumulation of incidents highlights the need to examine whether the Police are given appropriate tools given the challenges it is required to face and the importance of maximizing its current capabilities to improve its operations.