



State Comptroller Report | February 2023

Ministry of Defense

A Specific Plan for Building Up of Force



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Background


The specific plan for building up the force was led by the IDF's 22nd Chief of General Staff upon assuming office in January 2019. The plan was intended to improve the operational effectiveness of the fighting force in response to the changes in recent years in the battlefield and in the enemy's form of war. At the end of 2020, the IDF published the operational concept for victory, which ratified the principles underlying the plan, and published the 'Tnufa' Multi-Year Plan (from 2020 to 2024), which expanded the effort to increase specific capabilities of the IDF.

Key Figures

hundreds of millions of NIS

the total budget allocated to the specific plan for the building up of the force, of which 85% was for the first part of the plan





Audit Actions

 From July 2021 to June 2022, the State Comptroller's Office examined the implementation of the specific plan for building up the force. The IDF and the Ministry of Defense's work processes regarding its implementation and its effectiveness were also examined. The audit was carried out at the IDF and the Ministry of Defense. Completion examinations were carried out at Defense Industry A.

The Knesset State Audit Committee subcommittee decided not to bring this report in its entirety before the Knesset but to publish only parts thereof, to protect the state's security under Section 17 of the State Comptroller's Law, 1958 [Consolidated Version].



Key Findings

-  **Implementation of the Specific Plan for the Building up of the Force Versus the Planning** – the audit raised that the IDF implemented the plan in certain areas. However, as of June 2022, over three years since the plan was launched, certain discrepancies arose in its implementation compared to the planning.
-  **The Work Procedures in the Initiation and Organization Phase for the Implementation of the Weapon-A Project** – the IDF and the Ministry of Defense did not comply with the work procedures required in the initiation and organization phase for the implementation of the project for the development and equipping of the Weapon-A Project: in March 2019, the Planning Directorate at the IDF gave the "green light" to hold negotiations with the Weapon-A manufacturer, and in April 2019 the Directorate of Defense Research & Development (DDR&D) approved a tender exemption to contract that manufacturer. This was even before the approving ranks in the IDF approved the development of Weapon-A and its equipping as a replacement for Weapon-B, an existing weapon that was in use (their approvals were given in April and May 2019, respectively), and even before the engagement documents for the project were approved (in May 2019), including the technical characteristics and required content of work, based on which negotiations are conducted.
-  **Management and Control of the Program Administration During the Development Phase of Weapon-A** – the administration of the Weapon-A Program, entrusted with the integrative management of the project, with its initiation and with its component's development, also ensured the coordination between the various factors of development and trials. The administration summoned the Weapon-A manufacturer to the discussions chaired by it but did not summon the Weapon-C manufacturer (required for the development of Weapon-A) to increase ongoing cooperation between the two manufacturers, even though throughout the development process of Weapon-A, issues concerning the interface between Weapon-C and Weapon-A arose.
-  **Management and Control of the Program Administration During the Development Phase of Weapon-D** – in the summaries of discussions of the Weapon-D Program administration from July 2021 to February 2022, the presented information did not reflect the original schedule of delivery dates and the cumulative delay in the project execution. In the summary of discussions of the program administration from October 2020 to July 2021, the administration chairman presented the delay in the schedules in general terms. Hence, there was a delay of about a year and a half compared to the milestones set in the order. Failure to reflect the situation in the summary of the discussions of the program's administration may lead to conclusions that



do not correspond with actual occurrences of the weapon development. Moreover, the program's administration, whose duties include detecting and alerting irregularities in the project, held the second meeting in January 2020, about a year and a half after the first meeting; not according to the Ministry of Defense's directive by which the administration of a program will convene once every six months and contrary to the agreement of the administration chairman. Furthermore, since January 2020, the administration has convened three more times with an average frequency of once every eight months. Failure to convene the administration as often as required by the Ministry of Defense directive could affect the development process, in particular with compliance with the project's schedule, its budget, and the content set for it.



The Sub-Programs in the Specific System and the ICT – those sub-programs were implemented according to the planning in the program order from January 2019, except for specific contents in the ICT that were implemented in 2020 and 2021.

The Realization of the Plan for the Procurement of Other Weapons – the quantity mainly purchased corresponded to the plan. All weapons were delivered on time as planned except for two specific weapons.

Key Recommendations



It is recommended that the IDF and the Ministry of Defense investigate why components of a certain sub-program were not received three years after the program was launched and conclude from this, considering the need to adapt the duration of the development and procurement processes to an environment where technologies are developing at a rapid pace.



The IDF and the Ministry of Defense should applicate work procedures in the initiation and organization stage for the implementation of projects according to the relevant directives. By the optimal order of operations, projects will be presented to the IDF approving ranks, discussed and approved by them; technical characterization and content of work documents will be determined; And only afterwards the supplier's identity and engagement means be determined, and negotiations with it take place. Furthermore, it is recommended that the IDF promote the approval of Standing Order 10/1 of the Planning Directorate regarding initiating, developing, equipping, and receiving of weapons in the IDF in the updated version and publish the updated order.



It is recommended that development processes involving technological challenges, risks, and changes be managed by a program administration in the Ministry of Defense. The administration will convene at least at the minimum frequency required, once every six



months and, if necessary, more frequently. This is necessary to address gaps and barriers and discuss them, to find solutions and ensure compliance with the contents and schedules. It is further recommended that the discussion summaries of the program administration accurately present the project's status, including the cumulative delay, if any, to present to the relevant parties in the IDF and the Ministry of Defense a correct and up-to-date situation report. In projects whose feasibility depends on the product of a supplier who is a third party to the project, it is recommended that the program administration ensure that from the beginning of the development phase, there is optimal coordination between the suppliers and close cooperation between them to increase the certainty that the project will progress as required.

Summary

In the last two decades, the battlefield has changed gradually but fundamentally.

The audit raised that over three years since the specific plan for building up the force, intended to improve particular capabilities, was launched – gaps were found in its implementation. Moreover, the audit found deficiencies in the work processes of the IDF and the Ministry of Defense in initiating and controlling specific projects.

Given the above, it is recommended that the IDF and the Ministry of Defense investigate what were the deficiencies that led to situation that components of the plan were not received.