



Report of the State Comptroller of Israel |
December 2025

The Effectiveness of the Seam Line Barrier and Crossings in the Jerusalem Envelope



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Background

The Seam Line barrier and crossings in the Jerusalem Envelope are a central component of the security of the residents of Jerusalem, the surrounding communities, and all of Israel. The proper functioning of the barrier and the crossings is essential for preventing terrorist attacks and infiltration into Israel and ensuring the proper provision of services for their users, including Israeli citizens, Palestinians, residents of East Jerusalem, and students. The October 7, 2023 attack and the Swords of Iron War have increased the importance of examining the defense of the Jerusalem Envelope. The Office of the State Comptroller has conducted another audit of the effectiveness of the barrier and crossings in the Jerusalem Envelope.

The Seam Line in the Jerusalem Envelope is several hundred kilometers long. There is a barrier along 61% of the route, but not along the rest of it. The areas along the route lacking a barrier are: 11 km along one section, 6 km along a second section, about 250 m along a third section, and several dozen kilometers along two other sections. The route of the barrier in the Jerusalem Envelope does not fully align with the city's area of jurisdiction, with some of it passing through Judea and Samaria. Some areas within Jerusalem's jurisdiction are east of the barrier (i.e., outside the Seam Line alignment).

In February 2025, the draft report was sent to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of National Security, the IDF, and the Israel Police, among others, in order to receive their comments on the draft report. The responses of the IDF and the Israel Police were received in May and April 2025, respectively.

On September 8, 2025, after the audit end date, six Israelis were murdered and about ten were injured in a murderous terror attack at Ramot Junction in Jerusalem. The attack was carried out by terrorists who were residents of Palestinian villages in the Ramallah area. Further to the findings of the audit presented in this report and against the backdrop of the security risks from terrorist activity originating in Judea and Samaria, in particular for Jerusalem and the surrounding area, it is important and urgent to rectify the deficiencies identified in this audit, while considering implementation of the recommendations.



Key Figures

27 lethal attacks in 2023

in addition to 10 shooting incidents against Israeli forces, 412 thrown Molotov cocktails, 98 incidents involving explosive devices, and 1,031 incidents of stone-throwing at security forces in the Jerusalem Envelope

In a significant portion

of the several hundred kilometers of the Seam Line in the Jerusalem Envelope there is no barrier

NIS 8.3 billion

The cost of constructing the barrier throughout Judea and Samaria, including the cost of constructing a barrier in the Jerusalem Envelope

135,000 pedestrians per day

passed through the crossings in 2022. This number increased by 53% from 2018 to 2022

2,427 illegal residents

were apprehended in the Jerusalem Envelope in the first quarter of 2023, and 1,233 were apprehended in the first quarter of 2024

There is a significant discrepancy

between the infiltration records of IDF surveillance stations¹ in the Jerusalem Envelope and the records of the Israel Police on infiltration alerts² from January to May 2024. This discrepancy may indicate an inadequate operational response by the routine security forces of the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police

1 The surveillance stations are operated by observers who observe using surveillance methods and document every incident suspected of being hostile activity in the area, including infiltration of the barrier and damage to the intrusion detection fence.

2 From Palestinian Authority areas into Israeli territory.



80 minutes

is the average waiting time for pedestrians at the Qalandia Crossing. The average waiting time for vehicles at this crossing is 56 minutes


For approx. 20 years

the Israel Police has been managing the crossings without an operational doctrine, although 20 years have passed since the National Security Council's (NSC) plan to civilianize the crossings in the Jerusalem Envelope was approved by the Prime Minister. Thus, since 2005, this plan has not been submitted for discussion by the government, and as of 2024, none of the crossings in the Jerusalem Envelope area have been civilianized, and the Israel Police retains responsibility for operating the crossings

At some of the crossings

operated by the Israel Police, out of the 16 crossings in the Jerusalem Envelope, command of the crossings is not fixed and only two of the commanders have been certified for their role

Audit Actions

 From January 2024 to February 2025, the Office of the State Comptroller conducted an audit of the effectiveness of the Seam Line barrier and crossings in the Jerusalem Envelope. The audit examined a variety of issues, including the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police's responsibility and authority, the threat reference and reference scenario, the effectiveness of the operational response along the Seam Line barrier, openings in the barrier, the operational doctrine for the crossings, the heterogeneity of the forces operating the crossings, security and screenings at the crossings, adapting the infrastructure at the crossings given population growth, and civilianizing the crossings.

The audit was conducted at the Israel Police: National Headquarters, Operations Department, Planning Department, Border Police, Jerusalem District, and Judea and Samaria District; at the IDF: Central Command and the Military Police; at the Ministry of Defense (MOD): the Office of the Minister of Defense, Security Fence and Border Administration, Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), and Crossing Points Authority (CPA); at the Ministry of National Security; at the Israel Security Agency (ISA, also known as the Shin Bet); at the Ministry of Transport and Road Safety (Ministry of Transport); at the Prime Minister's Office; at the National Security Council (NSC); at the Cabinet Secretariat; and at the Municipality of Jerusalem. Supplementary work for the audit was conducted until July 2025.



The subcommittee of the Knesset's State Control Committee decided not to submit this report in its entirety to the Knesset, but rather to publish only parts of it, for the protection of state security, in accordance with Article 17 of the State Comptroller Law, 5718-1958 [Consolidated Version].

Section One: Implementation of Decisions by the Government or Prime Minister

Key Findings

Discussion in the Political-Security Cabinet – Government decisions over the years regarding the barrier and the crossings in the Jerusalem Envelope relate to a series of issues: civilianizing the Jerusalem Envelope crossings; implementing Decision B/43 regarding the agency in charge of security screenings of Passengers at Jerusalem Envelope crossings; Government Decision 4784, which addresses, inter alia, the transfer of responsibility for security in a certain area of Jerusalem from the IDF to the Israel Police; and Government Decision 4783, according to which the route of the fence in a certain area shall be moved east so that it surrounds a certain area (and leaves it on the Palestinian side of the fence. The audit found that the Political-Security Cabinet had not discussed the status of implementation of these decisions, despite the lapse of two decades since their approval.

The deficiencies identified in this report regarding the non-implementation of government decisions on the Jerusalem Envelope have significant security implications, diplomatic ramifications, and even economic impacts.

Given the length of time that has passed since the barrier's construction and the openings that remain in it, the barrier does not sufficiently prevent the entry into Israel of illegal residents or attackers. This deficiency increases the importance of the political and military leadership periodically discussing, examining, and monitoring this issue, in particular given the changing security situation and the increased threats following the events of October 7, 2023.

Non-Implementation of the Prime Minister's Decisions to Civilianize the Jerusalem Envelope Crossings

- In March 2005, then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon approved the NSC's plan regarding the Jerusalem Envelope. The plan's purpose was to examine the route existing at that time and its impacts, and it included recommendations for the Jerusalem



Envelope, with an emphasis on reducing disruption of the daily lives of East Jerusalem residents. The plan included transferring responsibility for operating the existing crossings to civilian agencies.

- In November 2017, the NSC prepared a political-security cabinet resolution proposal to civilianize four crossings – the Rachel, Qalandia, Bitunia, and Metzudat Adumim crossings – by transferring responsibility for their management and operation from the Israel Police to the CPA in the MOD. This was supposed to be completed within 12 months of the date the decision was budgeted and staffing positions were allocated to the MOD. The civilianization plan explained the necessity of civilianizing the crossings due to the lack of homogeneity of the agencies operating them, which made it very difficult to operate them and caused many deficiencies.
- The audit found that the NSC's civilianization plan, which was approved by the Prime Minister in 2005, had not been brought to the government for consideration, despite the passage of two decades since its approval.
- In February 2023, the Prime Minister instructed the NSC to perform inter-ministerial staff work to examine the responsibility for the security and operation of the international land crossings and internal crossings, including examining the civilianization of the Jerusalem Envelope crossings in accordance with a multi-year plan.
- Previous State Comptroller reports that warned about the non-implementation of the plan and NSC-led discussions did not bring about change. As of 2024, none of the crossings in the Jerusalem Envelope have been civilianized, and the Israel Police retains responsibility for operating the crossings. The audit also found that according to the CPA's estimates (from March 2024), the one-time budget needed for civilianizing all of the Jerusalem Envelope crossings is approx. NIS 600 million, and the annual budget needed for operating all of the crossings (after civilianizing them) in the Jerusalem Envelope is approx. NIS 500 million, but this budget has not yet been allocated.
- The lack of a decision on the question of civilianizing the crossings constitutes a serious and ongoing deficiency that is liable to endanger the forces operating the crossings, the Israeli population using them, and the residents of Jerusalem and Israel as a whole, and it could also seriously disrupt the daily lives of people using the crossings. The Office of the State Comptroller views with gravity the fact that the NSC plan to civilianize the Jerusalem Envelope crossings, which was approved by the Prime Minister as early as 2005, and whose importance was reaffirmed by the Prime Minister in 2014, has not been brought to the government for consideration over the years. As a result, the Political-Security Cabinet has also not discussed the plan to civilianize the crossings, despite the lapse of two decades since its approval.



Non-Implementation of Government Decision B/43 Regarding the Agency in Charge of the Security of Passengers at Jerusalem Envelope Crossings

- With regard to the handling of Passengers and their belongings, Decision B/43 stipulates that the Shin Bet is responsible for the professional directives for all crossings, except the crossings that the IDF is responsible for operating. The audit found that even over two decades after Ministerial Committee Decision B/43 was reached, the Shin Bet is still not implementing it, and does not provide directives to the Israel Police regarding the security screening of Passengers. Given the lack of guidance from the Shin Bet, the Israel Police sets its own directives regarding screenings and the level of screenings for Jerusalem Envelope crossings, taking into account the full range of considerations. The Shin Bet is in charge of providing such directives at other land crossings and imposes requirements for additional measures necessary for screenings that the Israel Police does not use. Thus, the lack of Shin Bet directives on this issue could affect the effectiveness of security screenings at the crossings.
- The audit found that despite the July 2018 decision by the Deputy Director of the NSC and the head of the NSC's counter-terrorism department to formulate a proposed amendment to Decision B/43 and to submit it to the Ministerial Committee on the Shin Bet³ in the second half of 2018, as of the audit end date, the NSC had not submitted it. This could lead to deficiencies in the security screenings at the crossings and to the smuggling of weapons into Israel's territory that could be used for terrorist activity. Given that the NSC has not submitted the decision for discussion by the Ministerial Committee on the Shin Bet, the committee has not discussed it, let alone made a decision about it, and the Shin Bet continues to act contrary to this decision. The non-amendment of the Political-Security Cabinet's decision could lead to ineffective levels of security screenings and non-fulfillment of the purpose of the crossings as security crossings and could endanger the forces operating them.

Non-Implementation of Government Decision 4784 On Transferring Security Responsibility from the IDF to the Israel Police in Various Areas of Jerusalem

– The audit found that despite Government Decision 4784 from 2006, which stipulated that the security responsibility in various areas of Jerusalem would be assigned to the IDF, in practice, the IDF and the Israel Police jointly decided to transfer the responsibility for security to the Israel Police, without an amendment of the government decision.

Given the lack of a barrier between these areas in Jerusalem and Palestinian villages in Judea and Samaria, the Israel Police has difficulty fulfilling the responsibility transferred to it. As a result, Palestinians move freely from Judea and Samaria to areas in Jerusalem

³ The Ministerial Committee on the Shin Bet is chaired by the Prime Minister, and its members include the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Defense, and the Minister of National Security.



via the Palestinian villages, weapons are transferred, terrorists infiltrate, drugs are trafficked, and taxable goods are smuggled from Judea and Samaria to areas in Jerusalem (the municipal area of Jerusalem) and Israel.

📌 Non-Implementation of Government Decision 4783 Regarding the Route of the Barrier – The route of the barrier established next to a certain area left the area as an enclave in the "blue" territory (on the west side of the barrier). As a result, there remains an 11-km-long opening that allows people coming to the area of the route and its Palestinian residents free movement into Jerusalem. The audit found that despite Government Decision 4783 and the state's subsequent notification to the High Court of Justice in June 2006, according to which it had been decided to amend the route of the fence along one section of the route and to move it east so that it surrounded the area and left it on the "Palestinian" side of the fence, the MOD had not constructed the barrier along the amended route in accordance with the government decision. The Office of the State Comptroller brings to the attention of the MOD that non-implementation of Government Decision 4783 perpetuates the route of the barrier around one area and leaves an opening that allows free movement, without security screenings, of Palestinians into the neighborhoods of Jerusalem and the surrounding areas and into Israel. This situation increases security risks for residents of the Israeli communities in the area and disrupts the daily life of the civilian population on both sides of the barrier. The risk is further underscored by the events of October 7, 2023, and in view of the Border Police's poor operational response.

Key Recommendations

- 💡 The Prime Minister of Israel, in cooperation with the Minister of Defense and the Minister of National Security, should advance a proposed resolution regarding the plan to civilianize the Jerusalem Envelope crossings and all of the crossings in the various sectors and submit the plan to the government for consideration and decision.
- 💡 Given the Prime Minister's 2023 directive to carry out inter-ministerial staff work, including examining the civilianization of the Jerusalem Envelope crossings according to a multi-year plan, the NSC should promptly complete the staff work that it began, formulate a budget-backed plan that includes timeframes, and present it to the government, so that a decision is reached on the matter.
- 💡 The NSC should submit to the Ministerial Committee on the Shin Bet its proposal for the amendment of Decision B/43, which addresses the responsibility for security screening of Passengers and their belongings; and the committee should subsequently discuss and reach a decision on the matter. However, as long as this decision has not been amended, the Shin Bet should make sure to operate in accordance with it. Any decision reached should determine the resources necessary for implementing it and their sources of funding,



to improve the Israel Police's capabilities for security screenings of Passengers and their belongings.



The NSC, the Israel Police, and the IDF, in coordination with the Municipality of Jerusalem, should redefine the division of responsibility and authority between the IDF and the Israel Police in areas of Jerusalem, and formulate a feasible action plan that enables the Israel Police and the IDF to operate optimally on both sides of the barrier and within Jerusalem's municipal area. In addition, they should act to prevent Palestinians from Judea and Samaria from entering areas of Jerusalem barrier. If necessary, the NSC should bring about the amendment of Government Decision 4784, so that it sets out the division of responsibility between the IDF and the Israel Police, and should act to implement it in the relevant areas, to increase the security of Israel's citizens.



The Minister of Defense should discuss the security implications of not constructing the barrier along a certain section of the route, based on the current threat reference and given the events of October 7, 2023, and the resulting security needs. The Director of the NSC should subsequently bring up the topic of the barrier's construction along this route for discussion by the Political-Security Cabinet and for its decision regarding the route of the barrier. Once a decision is reached on changing the existing route, the NSC should track its implementation.

Section Two: Command and Control



Key Findings



The Lack of a Police Operational Doctrine Regarding the Crossings – For about 20 years, since the construction of the Jerusalem Envelope crossings in 2005, the Israel Police has been managing the crossings without an operational doctrine. Such an operational doctrine should determine the rules, principles, processes, and modes of action necessary for fulfilling the purpose of each crossing. The doctrine should address the principles according to which the Israel Police operates at the crossings, the division of authority and responsibility for implementation between the various police agencies, and the other components of building up and operating the forces operating at the crossings. The operational doctrine would also serve as a basis for debriefing and training. The lack of an operational doctrine leads to a lack of direction regarding the operation of the crossings and the resources necessary for operational response along the barrier and at the crossings.



The Office of the State Comptroller brings to the attention of the Ministry of National Security and the Israel Police that the lack of an operational doctrine leads to a lack of direction regarding the manner of operating the crossings and the resources necessary for the operational response along the barrier and at the crossings. This state of affairs is liable to lead to a failure in addressing aspects necessary for the operation and security of the crossings, thus impairing their intended purpose. Moreover, without an operational doctrine, there is no proper and complete analysis of the scope of the manpower, infrastructure, and capabilities needed at the crossings.

-  **The Jerusalem Envelope Border Police's Responsibility and Authority** – The audit found that in the Police's organization order regarding the seam zone in the Jerusalem Envelope and the reorganization document, there is no mention of the Border Police forces' subordination to the Judea and Samaria District, which has territorial responsibility for some sections of the barrier, even though the commander of the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police has full operational responsibility in the Jerusalem Envelope. The orders' lack of clarity regarding subordination makes it difficult to operate the forces in the Jerusalem Envelope sector, as was also found in the investigation regarding the terrorist attack at a certain crossing. The Jerusalem Envelope Border Police's organizational structure and operations, under the command of four branches of the IDF and the Israel Police (IDF Central Command, the Israel Police's Jerusalem District and Judea and Samaria District, and the commander of the Border Police) has not been examined for 22 years, since the establishment of the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police in 2002, despite the complexity of its operations. The audit also found that even though the reorganization document states that the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police's headquarters is responsible for the operation of the crossings via the Crossings Unit of the Jerusalem District, in practice, the Crossings Unit operates only some of the 16 crossings in the Jerusalem Envelope, while the rest of the crossings are operated directly by the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police.
-  **The Israel Police's Responsibility in a Certain Area** – The audit found that the Israel Police has been unsuccessful in fulfilling its responsibility to establish public order in a certain area under the jurisdiction of the Municipality of Jerusalem and under the security responsibility of the IDF. This non-fulfillment of the Israel Police's responsibility leads to a lack of governance in this area, including a lack of municipal services. The lack of governance impairs the Israel Police's ability to take enforcement measures and operate when its intervention is necessary (in construction offenses, in cases of domestic violence, in dealing with fires, etc.). This is because in order to perform operational activity in this area, the Israel Police needs the IDF's approval and coordination, in order to provide the necessary security framework, given that the police forces' entry into this area is often accompanied by riots, and there is a danger of live fire against the forces. This danger is increased by the ability of Palestinians from Judea and Samaria to enter this area. Moreover, the fact that this area's residents have Israeli ID cards that allow them to move freely throughout Israel has been exploited in order to carry out terrorist



attacks in Israel. This raises the concern that the lack of basic law enforcement and public order in this area endangers the security of Israel's citizens.

📌 Multiplicity of Forces (Heterogeneity) at the Crossings – The audit found that the multiplicity of forces operating at the Jerusalem Envelope crossings – the Israel Police, Border Police, IDF, and civilian security guards – and the differences between them (in organizational culture, methods of operation, and training) create great difficulty and pose a challenge to command and control, which leads to operational deficiencies, as found in the lessons learned following several serious security incidents. The forces at these crossings are heterogeneous forces from different agencies (Israel Police, Border Police, IDF, and civilian security guards). For example, the investigation of the terrorist attack that occurred at a certain crossing found that the commander of the crossing had difficulty asserting his authority as necessary vis-à-vis the forces under his authority, due to the heterogeneity of the forces. The lack of regulation of the force structure at the crossings increases the risk of deficiencies in the deployment of force and of friendly fire incidents, and endangers the forces.

📌 Command and Training Deficiencies at the Crossings – While command of the Jerusalem Envelope crossings is a unique challenge due to the multiplicity of forces operating at these crossings, there is no procedure that requires the employment of fixed crossing commanders. The audit found that at some of the Jerusalem Envelope crossings under the command of the Border Police, the command of the crossing is not fixed, and is sometimes assigned to a squad commander or Border Police officer. The lack of fixed crossing commanders and the frequent changeover, at each shift, of the commander of the combat force at the crossing, disrupt the continuity of command and directives.

The Office of the State Comptroller brings to the attention of the Commander of the Border Police that the management of the Jerusalem Envelope crossings, with all their complexity, requires suitable training. The cessation of the certification course endangers the police officers and Passengers at the crossings. This situation is all the more serious because although the commanders of the crossings under the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police's command are not fixed, they are needed for dealing with the large number of Passengers at the crossings, as well as for fulfilling numerous missions assigned to them and managing three different security forces (police, security guards, and soldiers).

📌 The Weapons at the Disposal of the Forces at the Crossings – There are deficiencies in certain weapons of the Israel Police forces at Jerusalem Envelope crossings.




📌 The Lack of a National Statutory Agency for the Crossings – There is no central statutory agency in Israel for handling all non-international land crossings. In practice, there are three agencies involved in managing these crossings (the Israel Police, the IDF, and the CPA). Each of the crossings is managed according to a different operational



doctrine, infrastructure, and security screening devices, and based on a separate budget, preventing operational uniformity at the crossings. Moreover, the lack of a national master plan for the crossings against the backdrop of a developing and dynamic environment is liable to undermine the long-term ability to address all of the security, safety, and operational needs of the crossings. These ongoing deficiencies, which were also found in previous audit reports, could create vulnerabilities, especially at Jerusalem Envelope crossings, and disrupt daily life. Infiltrators and attackers are liable to exploit these vulnerabilities to carry out attacks within Israel or attack Passengers and workers at the crossings. It should be emphasized that as early as the 2017 audit report, the State Comptroller noted that the NSC should present to the government a plan to establish a central agency to manage all of the crossings between Israel and Judea and Samaria.

The Office of the State Comptroller reiterates that determining an overall agency that adapts operations to developing challenges at the crossings in Israel, while looking to the future and under a single operational doctrine, is likely to lead to effective management of the crossings and to the optimal allocation of resources, while examining the needs of each crossing and addressing developing threats.

Key Recommendations

-  The Director General of the Ministry of National Security, in cooperation with the Police Commissioner, should ensure the completion of the approval processes of an operational doctrine for the Jerusalem Envelope crossings and barrier. The Israel Police should derive all the implications from this doctrine and, based on them, formulate a systematic action plan to enable the effective management of the crossings.
-  The Israel Police's Planning Department, in cooperation with the Border Police's headquarters, should act to adapt the reorganization document to the reality on the ground, and regulate the issue of command and responsibility and the deployment of the forces in the organization's documents, in order to improve the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police's operational activity in the Jerusalem Envelope.
-  The Commander of the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police, in cooperation with the Border Police's headquarters, should select for the crossings fixed commanders and deputy commanders who have been trained for their mission, in order to create a fixed chain of command at the crossings. This would ensure the orderly management of the crossings and the safety and security of the forces operating at them, and contribute to fulfilling the Border Police's roles at the crossings under its responsibility. The Commander of the Border Police, who is responsible for the Border Police's force buildup, should ensure the existence of a training course for commanders and ensure that the position of crossing commanders in the Jerusalem Envelope is staffed by fixed commanders who have undergone a training



course based on a training plan. This course would provide crossing commanders with the knowledge and tools to carry out their duties optimally.



The NSC should take immediate action to fulfill the Prime Minister's directive and complete the staff work on the crossings that began in 2023. Upon its completion, a multi-year plan for the crossings should be formulated that addresses developing challenges. This should be done in coordination with all of the organizations involved in managing the crossings and taking into account all relevant issues – diplomatic and security issues, the needs of the population, and economic and demographic aspects. In this framework, it is important to consider deciding on a single statutory agency to coordinate and determine uniform standards for the operation of the internal crossings, in order to prevent attacks within Israel, create maximum security for the Passengers and workers at the crossings, and maintain a reasonable quality of life. After completing the staff work, the NSC should present it to the government for a decision.

Section Three: The Operational Response for the Jerusalem Envelope

Key Findings



The Police's Preparedness for a Sudden Incident in the Jerusalem Envelope sector – The Threat Reference and the Reference Scenario in the Jerusalem Envelope sector before October 7, 2023 – The audit found that prior to October 7, 2023, the Jerusalem District did not have a threat reference or a reference scenario for making preparations, by means of suitable force buildup in the Jerusalem Envelope sector, to prevent mass incursion into Israeli territory. This state of affairs could have undermined the district's preparedness for threats from Judea and Samaria in a scenario similar to that of October 7, 2023, and as a result, could have undermined the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police's ability to carry out their mission.

The Office of the State Comptroller brings to the attention of the Head of the Israel Police's Operations Directorate that no order had been written for the Central District prior to the events of October 7, 2023. Without such an order, the Jerusalem District and the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police could not prepare a derived order at the district and regional levels, thus impairing the readiness of the Jerusalem District and the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police for a sudden terror attack.



- 📌 The Israel Police Jerusalem District's Preparedness after October 7, 2023 –** Only following the events of October 7, 2023, did the Jerusalem District and the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police issue preparedness orders for a scenario similar to such events, which were completed in August 2024. The orders issued after October 7, 2023, did not include an operative order defining how to prepare for the scenario of a violent breach in several locations, despite the Shin Bet's assessment that the Palestinians felt they had the ability to pass over the crossings and the Seam Line without difficulty or much risk. The audit also found that the exercise conducted by the Gaza Envelope Border Police in December 2023, after the October 7 events, emphasized the need to supplement the Jerusalem District Border Police's force buildup by increasing urban combat training; improving individual and team soldiering skills, with an emphasis on threat scenarios; conducting exercises with neighboring forces; and intensifying the region's force buildup by equipping the forces with military weapons in order to counter increased activity of terrorist cells.
- 📌 Sharing Intelligence Information between the Shin Bet, the Police, and the IDF (Central Command) –** The audit found that according to Central Command (the Intelligence Officer and the Operations Officer), the intelligence officers of Central Command, the Judea and Samaria Division, and the Etzion and Binyamin regional brigades regularly share relevant intelligence information online with the Israel Police, and according to a former commander of investigations and intelligence in the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police, there are no deficiencies in the transfer of intelligence information from the Shin Bet and IDF intelligence agents to the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police. However, the audit there lacks a uniform online for directly transferring and sharing intelligence information between Central Command, the Shin Bet, and the Israel Police. Due to this deficiency, Central Command uses additional manpower necessary for transferring the intelligence information. The deficiency in the uniform computer system could cause errors and difficulties in the quick transfer of intelligence information between the agencies, which in turn could cause operational failures.
- 📌 The Operational Response along the Seam Line Barrier in the Jerusalem Envelope –** The audit found that despite Central Command's claim that it constantly removes earth fill next to the barrier on the Palestinian side, there are still times when there is earth fill next to the barrier in the Jerusalem Envelope or construction on the Palestinian side above the height of the wall. This poses a security risk to the civilian population living and moving alongside the barrier, and to the security forces. The danger includes the ability of attackers to throw stones and Molotov cocktails and to launch firecrackers and the like toward the Israeli side, which harms the security of residents and undermines the purpose of the wall in the Jerusalem Envelope barrier.



Example of Earth Fill Adjacent to the Wall in Certain Areas (as of May 2024)



Source: Israel Police, processed by the Office of the State Comptroller.

📌 Diversion of Jerusalem Envelope Border Police Forces from Routine Security Missions

– The audit found that the diversion of Jerusalem Envelope Border Police forces from routine security missions along the route of the barrier to handle incidents of civil unrest on the "red" side (Judea and Samaria), reinforce manpower at crossings, accompany and guard detainees, and reinforce forces in the Jerusalem District undermines the effectiveness of the operational response along the barrier. It is estimated that 30% of the time, the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police's deployment of forces is allocated to missions that are not directly related to routine security along the barrier in the Jerusalem Envelope. This fact, along with an 11.5% staffing shortfall of police officers, raise concerns about the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police's ability to carry out the missions assigned to it within its responsibility for the Jerusalem Envelope. Ongoing non-fulfillment of a certain kind of routine security missions in the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police's region, which is aimed, among other things, to examine the integrity of the barrier and rule out penetration by attackers, especially in sectors with openings and near Jewish communities or neighborhoods, is liable first and foremost to endanger the residents of Jerusalem and the communities near the barrier and allow the entry into Israel of illegal residents, or attackers. For example, in 2023, Border Police platoons that are responsible, among other things, for a certain section of the barrier, did not carry out 40% of their missions related to routine security missions of a certain kind, and in 2024 they did not carry out 24% of their missions.

📌 Border Police Forces' Response to Barrier Infiltration Incidents

– The audit found that from January to May 2024, the recorded number of IDF surveillance infiltration alerts in the Jerusalem Envelope sector was significantly higher than the number of alerts



recorded by the Border Police. Thus, according to IDF records, during this period, there were several hundred infiltration alerts, while Border Police records during the same period recorded only dozens of such alerts. This disparity in the records may indicate an incomplete operational response of Jerusalem Envelope Border Police routine security forces arriving following an infiltration alert.

Deficiencies in Intelligence-Gathering Coverage – The audit found that given the importance of the full protection of the Seam Line in the Jerusalem Envelope and the complexity of the intelligence-gathering coverage, and despite the addition of intelligence-gathering measures, there is concern that the intelligence picture produced is not optimal. Deficiencies in this respect were raised by the Director of the Seam Line Administration,⁴ who in June 2024 stated that the rate of intelligence coverage in the Jerusalem Envelope sector at the barrier and the openings is not optimal, and by the Operations Officer of the Intelligence Battalion, who stated that the quality of the intelligence capabilities is a significant operational factor, and that there are no high-quality monitoring capabilities in the Jerusalem Envelope. In contrast, the IDF stated in its response that the intelligence coverage is based on intelligence capabilities that provide full intelligence coverage of the area. However, the IDF stated that the intelligence coverage is complicated and as a result, covert supplementary intelligence capabilities are deployed to strengthen the intelligence presence in the area for optimal coverage.

Deficiencies in the Functional Continuity of Intelligence-Gathering Capabilities – The audit found a deficiency in the intelligence-gathering capabilities in a certain area of one of the Jerusalem Envelope sectors that are operating without a back-up power supply, which could impair the functional continuity of the intelligence capabilities. In this situation, if a security incident occurs in this area during a power outage, the ability to identify and interpret the incident in real time will be impaired, as will the ability to debrief the incident afterward. This could impair the ability to provide an operational response to the incident.

The Operational Response at the Openings – The route of the Seam Line in the Jerusalem Envelope contains openings where the Ministry of Defense has not built a barrier for various reasons. As a result, there is free, uncontrolled entry into Israel for Palestinians, including 11 kilometers along one section, 6 kilometers along a second section, about 250 meters along a third section, and a few dozen kilometers along two other sections. The whole set of deficiencies regarding openings in the Jerusalem Envelope barrier creates a concerning picture whereby Palestinians can enter Israel

⁴ The Seam Line Administration operates within Central Command, under the command of an officer at the rank of brigadier general, subordinate to the commander of Central Command. Its function, among other things, is to serve as a strategic regional planning agency regarding civilian infrastructure and plans in Central Command's area, in particular in the seam zone and the Jerusalem Envelope. This includes responsibility for leading staff work to plan the route of the seam line barrier in terms of military, statutory, and legal considerations, to coordinate and represent the issues related to the seam line barrier, the crossings, and the seam zone vis-à-vis the Deputy Chief of Staff, the political leadership, various courts, the Knesset, and various government ministries.



without any monitoring or inspection, thereby endangering Israel's residents. Due to the absence of a barrier, the diversion of forces to handle incidents at one of the crossings, and the impairment of the routine security missions at the barrier and openings, there is a danger of terrorist incidents, since attackers can infiltrate into Israel and Jerusalem through the openings. The risk generated by this state of affairs is further increased in light of the events of October 7, 2023. The openings examined are as follows:

- **Route A (11 km)** – This opening allows the free movement of Palestinians, residents and visitors to the area, into areas of Jerusalem and the surrounding areas, without security screening, and there have been incidents of illegal entry and smuggling of goods through this opening;
- **Route B (6 km)** – This opening allows Palestinians to infiltrate, due to the diversion of Border Police forces from routine security operations to handle incidents at one of the crossings;
- **Route C (250 m)** – There are still deficiencies in the implementation of the security response and non-continuous police coverage.

Vulnerabilities in the Physical Barrier – Although the barrier in the Jerusalem Envelope was constructed to prevent Palestinians from entering and staying in Israel illegally, in practice, the barrier has for a long time failed to provide the necessary protection. For example, in the first quarter of each year from 2022 to 2024, approximately 2,000, 2,400, and 1,200 Palestinians illegally entered Israel each year, respectively. This constitutes a serious failure that allows attackers to infiltrate into Israel, and endangers the residents of Israel in general and of the neighborhoods close to the barrier in particular.

Moreover, the audit found that in April 2022, the (then) Commander of the Israel Police's Jerusalem District sent the Police Commissioner a document titled "Openings in the Jerusalem Envelope Barrier" in which he emphasized the Palestinians' constant attempt to damage the barrier, with an emphasis on the intrusion detection in certain areas along the barrier, and noted in this document weaknesses in the barrier


Furthermore, in an onsite inspection that the Security Fence and Border Administration and the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police conducted in July 2024 along the Jerusalem Envelope barrier, deficiencies in the barrier were found.


It is important to note that in January 2025, the Head of the Security Fence and Border Administration informed the audit team that all the deficiencies found during the onsite inspection conducted by the Security Fence and Border Administration and the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police in July 2024 had been addressed.

The audit also found that an additional upgrade to the barrier– the construction of a high concrete wall – is necessary, and that a disagreement between the Ministry of Defense





and the Ministry of National Security regarding the body responsible for the budget for upgrading the barrier is perpetuating the problem, thus endangering Israel's residents, especially in light of the events of October 7, 2023.

 **Deficiencies in the Electricity Connection and Functional Continuity at One of the Operations Centers** – There is concern that in an emergency situation, a problem could arise regarding functional continuity necessary at a certain operations center, notwithstanding that the operations center has an emergency generator.

 **Location of the Surveillance Stations** – The audit found that despite the threat that exists from the Judea and Samaria Sector due to the change that has occurred in the conception of the location of the IDF's surveillance stations in the rest of the sectors, and despite the change in the defense system of Border Police command centers, the conception of the location of IDF intelligence collection stations in the Jerusalem Envelope has not changed, and they remain located close to the Seam Line. This state of affairs is liable to place the observers in the Jerusalem Envelope at risk, even after the events of October 7, 2023, during which observers at an outpost close to the border with Gaza were murdered and taken hostage.


Key Recommendations


 The Minister of Defense should discuss all of the security risks and implications of not constructing a barrier along the first and second sections in question, based on the current threat reference and taking into account the events of October 7. Furthermore, the Head of the NSC should bring up the issue for discussion by the Political-Security Cabinet and its decision about the route of the barrier at these openings. Once a decision is reached about changing the existing route, the NSC should track its implementation. The Commander of the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police, in cooperation with the Commander of Central Command, the Commander of the Judea and Samaria Division, and the commanders of the regional brigades, should improve the operational response in the area of the first and third sections, including stationing along the third section the rest of the resources that the Head of the Seam Line Administration recommended in September 2023. The Commander of the Jerusalem District should adjust the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police's deployment of forces, both manpower and capabilities (resources), so that a police patrol vehicle is available and able to reach the third section, in order to minimize the chances of terrorist activity and infiltration into Israel through the openings, given the current threat reference and the security needs it creates.


 The Jerusalem District and the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police should ensure that all the necessary actions have been taken to adapt the buildup of forces, including manpower and capabilities, to cope with a sudden incident such as the events of October 7, 2023, in the Jerusalem sector. Moreover, the Jerusalem District and the Jerusalem Envelope Border




Police should update the orders as necessary in accordance with the order of Central Command, to enable the right combination of Police and IDF forces, and thereby ensure the optimal use of force.

 The Commander of Central Command, the Commander of the Israel Police's Jerusalem District, and the Regional Commander of the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police, together with the Municipality of Jerusalem, should improve how they address the operational deficiency resulting from the illegal construction and earth fill next to the Seam Line barrier in the Jerusalem Envelope, whether through enforcement or by considering the need to toughen punishment of lawbreakers, by means of a perimeter⁵ or any other measure to ensure the operational effectiveness of the barrier and to protect the Border Police forces operating close to the Seam Line barrier in the Jerusalem Envelope, as well as civilians moving in close proximity to the barrier.

 The Commander of the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police and the Commander of the Intelligence Battalion should examine the reasons for the disparities between the Israel Police's records and the Intelligence Battalion's data regarding the number of infiltration incidents. If disparities remain after this clarification, the Commander of the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police should examine why Border Police forces did not arrive at the locations where observers identified a suspected infiltration and take action vis-à-vis the Jerusalem District to rectify this deficiency. Moreover, the Commander of the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police should ensure that Police records of infiltration alerts by the intelligence-gathering forces, are kept in the control center system, in order to enable the Border Police Headquarters to monitor the arrival times of patrols and improve the response.





 Israel Police's Planning Department, the Border Police Headquarters, and the Jerusalem District should adapt the deployment of the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police's forces to the operations assigned to it and to its core areas of responsibility, in accordance with the organization's orders.

 The Head of the IDF Planning Directorate and the Head of the Israel Police Planning Division should act in accordance with the memorandum of understanding and make budgetary decisions about upgrading the barrier, while creating an organized mechanism with the Seam Line Administration and the Security Fence and Border Administration. After a decision is made regarding aspects of upgrading the infrastructure at the barrier and the crossings in the Jerusalem Envelope, the Head of the IDF Planning Directorate and the Head of the Israel Police' Planning Division should formulate a plan to perform the necessary upgrades according to agreed priorities. If the Head of the IDF Planning Directorate and the Head of the Israel Police Planning Division do not reach agreement,

⁵ An area next to the fence defined as a buffer zone that the enemy cannot enter and where special military directives apply, including special rules of engagement.



they may act in accordance with the memorandum of understanding – that is, refer the disagreement for resolution by the Chief of Staff and the Police Commissioner. If the Chief of Staff and the Police Commissioner are also unable to reach agreement, the disagreement should be referred for resolution by the Minister of Defense and the Minister of National Security, so that agreements are reached on this issue.

-  Central Command, in cooperation with the Security Fence and Border Administration, should urgently install the generators needed for a backup power supply for intelligence-gathering efforts in a certain area. The failure to address this issue immediately could impair the operational response of Jerusalem Envelope Border Police forces and allow attackers to penetrate into Israel.
-  The Commander of Central Command, in cooperation with the Commander of the IDF Ground Forces and the Israel Police, should promptly examine the concept of the location of intelligence-gathering stations close to the Seam Line, in order to minimize the risk to the stations and the persons present in them.
-  It is recommended that the IDF and the Israel Police examine the issue of additional backup power supply.
-  Given the importance of the full protection of the Seam Line in the Jerusalem Envelope and the complexity of intelligence coverage, and despite the addition of intelligence capabilities, Central Command should ensure full intelligence coverage to identify the penetration of attackers and infiltrators into Israel.

Section Four: Security and Screening of Persons Passing Through the Crossings

Key Findings

In the Jerusalem Envelope there are 16 crossings for supervising the passage of pedestrians, vehicles, and goods; there are also agricultural crossings and civilian access crossings. The crossings are located throughout the sector. The vehicle crossings into Israel are mainly intended for Israelis, while the pedestrian crossings are mainly used by Palestinians with entry permits into Israel and East Jerusalem residents living on the other side of the barrier. The goods crossings are intended for the transfer of Palestinian goods from Judea and Samaria to Israel and from Israel to Judea and Samaria. There are two pedestrian crossings: Hazeitim and Sheikh Saad; eight vehicle crossings: Ein Yael, Haminharot, Az-Za'ayyem, Hataba'at,



Hizma, Ofer, Ras Biddu, and Mizmor; five crossings for vehicles and pedestrians: Rachel, Sawahira, Qalandia, Shuafat, and Al-Jib; and one crossing for goods: Bitunia. From 2018 to 2022, there was a 53% increase in the number of pedestrians passing through the crossings per day, reaching 135,000 in 2022. In addition, there was a 23.4% increase in the number of trucks carrying goods through the crossings, reaching approximately 587,000 in 2022. From January to June 2024, during the Swords of Iron War, pedestrians were only allowed to use the Qalandia and Rachel crossings. During this period, 625,586 pedestrians passed through the Qalandia Crossing, and 264,037 passed through the Rachel Crossing.

📌 Insufficient Staffing of Security Guards at the Jerusalem Envelope Crossings

– The Ministry of National Security and the Israel Police were not prepared for staffing the shortage of civilian security guards at the Jerusalem Envelope crossings, and at the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, a significant portion of the security guards at these crossings, who are combat soldiers in the IDF, were called up for emergency reserve duty. This led to a further decrease in the deployment of security guards at the crossings, and thus to the closure of crossings or lanes within them and an undermining of their emergency preparedness.

📌 Security Screening at the Crossings by the Erez Battalion of the Military Police Corps

– A decrease in the number of soldiers in the Erez Battalion in June 2023, even before the Swords of Iron War, resulted in the battalion's ability to perform only 69% of its missions, so that 31% of the missions were not performed at all, substantially impairing the battalion's operational activity. The audit also found that starting in June 2023, there was a further decrease in the battalion's manpower, which increased the discrepancy between the battalion's missions and the needs of the Israel Police. The lack of a fixed minimum number of combat soldiers in the Military Police Corps prevents it from regularly completing all of its screening tasks, which sometimes leads to a reduction in the screening lanes at the vehicle crossings. The closure of screening lanes creates congestion, traffic jams, and bottlenecks at other crossings, making them vulnerable to attacks.

📌 Deficiencies in the Security and Screening of Vehicles at the Jerusalem Envelope Crossings

– Given the lack of suitable infrastructure and manpower shortage, the Israel Police has difficulty screening the vehicles at the crossings in the Jerusalem Envelope at the appropriate level, in order to minimize the occurrence of enormous traffic jams that endanger those waiting to enter Jerusalem from Judea and Samaria. The audit also found that the attempt to balance security screening with the flow of daily life undermines the level of the screening and increases the risk to the forces operating at the crossings and to persons passing through them, as well as the risk of unauthorized entry into Israel, including by terrorists. The security screening procedure of the Israel Police Security and Licensing Division is only partially maintained. This state of affairs could heighten the security risk.

📌 Deficiencies in Security Screening During Ramadan



- The audit found that even though Government Decision 4784 from April 2006 assigned the Israel Police responsibility for internal security, public order, and crime in the Jerusalem Envelope, including at the crossings, the decisions on the recommended number of entry permits for Palestinians, especially during Ramadan, were made by the Minister of Defense together with COGAT, without considering the Israel Police's ability to carry out the necessary levels of security screenings. According to the Israel Police, it takes part in discussions but its recommendations are not taken into consideration in decisions determining the number of entry permits for Palestinians during Ramadan.
- In addition, the infrastructure at the Rachel, Qalandia, and Hazeitim crossings does not enable the entry of all the worshippers within a six-hour period. For example, due to the existing infrastructure, the congestion during Ramadan in 2023 endangered people's lives, and 280 civilians were injured when worshippers passed through the crossings, including children who were subsequently in need of medical treatment. This situation endangers the lives of persons passing through the crossings and could harm Israel's reputation for supposedly not enabling safe freedom of worship within its territory, and could seriously undermine security, especially during the sensitive period of Ramadan.

Key Recommendations

- 💡 The Minister of Defense, the Minister of National Security, and the Police Commissioner, in cooperation with the Head of the NSC, should determine the infrastructure and resources required for ensuring the necessary balance between the security response to current challenges and threats related to the crossings in the Jerusalem Envelope and maintaining residents' quality of life. At the same time, it should formulate a dedicated plan, with the necessary funding, for improving the level of service at the Jerusalem Envelope crossings.
- 💡 The Director General of the Ministry of National Security and the Police Commissioner should ensure that all actions are taken to staff all of the security guard positions needed at each crossing, in order to properly address the security of the forces operating at the crossings and the people passing through them. Moreover, they should examine changing the employment conditions of security guards, including their wages and working hours per shift, taking into consideration the practices commonly adopted by other agencies, such as the CPA, and strengthening the emergency preparedness of crossings with respect to manpower. In this context, the Ministry of National Security and the Israel Police should ensure that the security companies follow orders at the crossings as part of the contract terms and that periodic monitoring of this issue is performed. They should also prepare in advance to reinforce the deployment of security guards in the case of an emergency military incident, when the security guards are called up for emergency reserve duty in the IDF. All of these would help maintain a sufficient number of security guards and enable



proper security at the Jerusalem Envelope crossings during normal operations and in emergencies.

Section Five: Adapting the Infrastructure at the Crossings to the Population Growth in Judea and Samaria

Key Findings

Upgrading the Crossings – The audit found that in the two decades since the construction of the crossings, the Ministry of Defense and the IDF have in recent years upgraded four⁶ of the 16 crossings (25%) in the Jerusalem Envelope. Investment in expanding four more crossings⁷ began in 2021 as part of a multi-year plan for the crossings. Since the infrastructure at the Jerusalem Envelope crossings had not been sufficiently strengthened over the years, the Ministry of Defense started taking action to adapt the crossings to their increased use. It is clear that in light of the delay in developing the crossings compared to the population growth during the past 20 years (in 2002, the Israeli population in Judea and Samaria was approximately 144,000 residents and at the end of 2022 it was approximately 500,000 residents), and given the expected population growth during the next 15 years (the Israeli population is expected to grow from 500,000 to 750,000 residents, and the Palestinian population is expected to grow from 2.9 million residents to 4.2 million residents), continued investment of resources is required to address security and passage at the crossings in alignment with this population growth.




Expanding the Road Close to Crossings – The Ministry of Transport decided to expand the road close to the Haminharot crossing in the Jerusalem Envelope without considering the impact of this expansion on the crossing, and without coordinating the addition of lanes to the crossing. This contributed to the creation of bottlenecks at the crossing, which create a security risk for the forces operating there, for persons passing through it and for the population of the Jerusalem Envelope, and disrupt daily life. It is important to note that in December 2024, there was a shooting attack on a bus waiting at the Haminharot crossing in which a ten-year-old child was murdered and three people were injured. Previously, in November 2023, six people were injured in a shooting attack

6 The Rachel, Qalandia, Bitunia, and Mizmorria crossings.


7 The Haminharot, Qalandia (the below-grade road), Hizma, and Az-Za'ayyem crossings.



at this crossing, including one critically injured. The two attacks occurred when vehicles were in traffic jams on the route through the crossing.

-  The Office of the State Comptroller brings to the attention of the Ministry of Transport that plans to expand roads in the Jerusalem Envelope need to be formulated in coordination with the agencies operating at the crossings, chiefly the Israel Police, which is in charge of operating the crossings, under the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the IDF and with the involvement of the NSC.
-  **Work on the Below-Grade Road at the Qalandia Crossing** – The opening of the below-grade road at the Qalandia crossing, whose construction began in May 2021 and was expected to be completed in August 2024, has been delayed several times due to disagreements between the contractor and the Ministry of Transport on one side and the Israel Police on the other side regarding meeting the Israel Police's requirements, including requirements related to securing the performance of the work and connections to infrastructure. The delay in the opening of the below-grade road interferes with achieving the goals of addressing the congestion in Pisgat Ze'ev and creating a bypass alternative for those traveling from the Binyamin communities to the center of Israel. The audit found that approximately NIS 95 million was invested in the crossing infrastructure of the below-grade road at Qalandia. However, by the beginning of December 2024, the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of National Security, and NSC had not determined who would operate it (the CPA or the Israel Police). This situation wastes public resources and seriously undermines good governance.
-  **Deficiencies in the Maintenance of the Crossings** – The audit found that the decision in the January 2007 memorandum of understanding regarding the transfer of authority for maintenance at the crossings from the IDF to the Israel Police, which was supposed to begin in January 2008, had not been implemented, and the issue of budgetary responsibility for maintenance at the crossings has been in dispute between the IDF and the Police for 16 years. As a result, although the Israel Police bears responsibility for operating the crossings, it is forced to operate within a budget and resources provided by the IDF and subject to its approval.

Key Recommendations

-  The Ministry of Defense and the IDF, with the assistance of the NSC, should implement the multi-year crossings plan at the Jerusalem Envelope crossings in order to adapt them to the growth of the population that uses them. The NSC, which initiated the staff work with regard to the crossings, should complete it, and in cooperation with the Ministry of Transport, IDF, and Israel Police, should update the preparation of the multi-year crossings plan, which relates to the construction and expansion of the infrastructure at the crossings and the roads near them, including in the Jerusalem Envelope. This work should take into



account the existing threats, while relating to the current reference scenario written by the Israel Police after October 7, 2023.

- 💡 The Minister of Defense and the Minister of Transport should make sure to operate in coordination in order to ensure that the infrastructure at the crossings is sufficient for the volume of persons passing through them, to enable a normal way of life and prevent security risks, given the threats present in the Jerusalem Envelope. The Minister of Defense should take action to complete the expansion of the Jerusalem Envelope crossings, as has been approved (Haminharot and Az-Za'ayem).
- 💡 The NSC should determine in advance criteria for deciding who is responsible for new crossings to be constructed and to involve them in the planning and implementation of the construction work. Moreover, the CPA should prepare to take on responsibility for the Qalandia crossing and to open it.








Hotspots of Civil Unrest in the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police Sector (as of December 2023)



According to Jerusalem Envelope Border Police documents, processed by the Office of the State Comptroller.



Figures on Civil Unrest and Terrorist Activity in the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police Sector

Type of Incident	Number of Incidents in 2023	Number of Incidents in the First Half of 2024
 Firecrackers	181	63
 Stone-throwing	1,031	300
 Incidents of explosive devices	98	13
 Incidents of Molotov cocktails	150	21
 Incidents of gunfire at Israeli forces	412	161
 Terrorist attacks	10	1
 Terrorist attacks	27	4

According to Jerusalem Envelope Border Police documents, processed by the Office of the State Comptroller.



Summary

The Seam Line barrier and the crossings in the Jerusalem Envelope are an important component of the security of the residents of Jerusalem and all of Israel. The proper functioning of the barrier and the crossings is essential for preventing terrorist attacks and infiltration into Israel and for ensuring the proper provision of services to their users, including Israeli citizens, Palestinians, residents of East Jerusalem, and students. The events of October 7, 2023, and the Swords of Iron War have increased the importance of examining the issue of the defense of the Jerusalem Envelope.

The deficiencies noted in this report relate to both the barrier and the crossings in the Jerusalem Envelope, including deficiencies in the exercise of responsibility and authority of the Israel Police, the IDF, and the various agencies within the Israel Police; the continued existence of the openings in the barrier, which enable Palestinians from Judea and Samaria to illegally enter Jerusalem; and deficiencies in the Israel Police's preparedness to cope with a sudden attack from Judea and Samaria against Israel, including in the Jerusalem sector, especially given the events of October 7, 2023.

The report also noted numerous deficiencies regarding the operation of the crossings and the fulfillment of their purpose in the Jerusalem Envelope, including the lack of an operational doctrine for the crossings; the multiplicity of forces operating at the crossings (the heterogeneity of the forces); the lack of fixed command at the majority of the crossings, which creates enormous difficulties and challenges for command and control; and the disparity between the Israel Police's responsibility for operating the crossings and its ability to handle their maintenance, upgrading, and adaptation to population growth in Judea and Samaria, which undermines the effectiveness of the crossings and their ability to fulfill their mission, while balancing between security needs and maintaining normal daily life.

The Office of the State Comptroller views with severity the fact that the plan to civilianize the Jerusalem Envelope crossings that was devised by the NSC and approved by the Prime Minister in 2005, and whose importance was reaffirmed by the Prime Minister in 2014, has for years not been brought to the government for discussion, even though civilianization could significantly affect the way of life and security of Israel's residents, including the residents of East Jerusalem, and the Palestinian population.

The decisions reached by the government over the years regarding the barrier and the crossings in the Jerusalem Envelope relate to a series of topics: civilianization of the Jerusalem Envelope crossings; implementation of Decision B/43 regarding the agency in charge of security screenings of Passengers at Jerusalem Envelope crossings; Government Decision 4784, which addresses, among other things, the transfer of security responsibility from the IDF to the Israel Police in a certain area of Jerusalem; and Government Decision 4783, according to which the route of the fence along a certain section will be moved east so that it surrounds this area and leaves it on the Palestinian side of the fence. The audit found that



the Political-Security Cabinet has not discussed the status of implementation of these decisions despite two decades having passed since their approval.

The deficiencies described in this report regarding non-implementation of government decisions relating to the Jerusalem Envelope have significant security, diplomatic, and economic impacts.

The deficiencies noted in the report lead to the conclusion that, considering the long time that has passed since the construction of the Jerusalem Envelope barrier and given the openings that remain in it, the barrier does not sufficiently prevent the entry into Israel of illegal residents or terrorists. These deficiencies increase the importance of periodic discussion, examination, and monitoring by the political-security echelon, especially given the changing security situation and the increased threats following the events of October 7, 2023.

The Minister of Defense and the Minister of National Security, with the assistance of the Head of the NSC, should address the disparities between the responsibility of the Israel Police, its various agencies, and the IDF and their authority for fulfilling their responsibility in the Jerusalem Envelope, so as to optimally address the security needs at the Jerusalem Envelope barrier and crossings and adapt them to the changing threats and the increased use of the crossings.

The Prime Minister, in cooperation with the Minister of Defense and the Minister of National Security, should advance a proposed resolution regarding the plan to civilianize the Jerusalem Envelope crossings, including the crossings in the various sectors, and submit the plan for discussion and decision by the government. The Police should accelerate the completion of its preparedness for the current reference scenario, which takes into consideration the existing threats and the scenario that occurred on October 7, 2023, and it should address the deficiencies noted in this report in order to improve the Jerusalem Envelope Border Police's ability to carry out its missions.

The responsibility for rectifying the deficiencies described in this report lies mainly with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of National Security, the Chief of Staff, the Police Commissioner, the Commander of the Police Operations Coordination Center, the Commander of the Jerusalem District, and the Commander of the Border Police – each at its own level.

