



State Comptroller of Israel | Local Government
Audit Report | July 2025

Conduct During Emergencies and the
Swords of Iron War

Local Authorities' Preparedness for Fires – Follow-up Audit



Local Authorities' Preparedness for Fires – Follow-up Audit

Background

Local authorities play a critical role in the preparation for various emergency events, encompassing scenarios that occur during combat situations where the home front becomes a target for artillery and remote weaponry (wartime emergencies) as well as emergencies that arise during peacetime, often without prior warning, such as fires exacerbated by extreme weather conditions (civilian emergencies). Within the context of fire incidents in Israel, forest and woodland fires are the most prevalent. These types of fires pose significant threats to human life and property, primarily due to the proximity of numerous localities to forested areas, with some localities situated directly within these zones. The buffer area between the localities and woodland presents a unique challenge for preparedness, as fires can readily spread from the forest towards inhabited regions, thereby endangering lives and properties.

The local authority functions as a "foundational element" maintaining direct and regular communication with the public in its jurisdiction on a daily basis, with the responsibility of consistently providing essential needs and services¹. In 2018, the Office of the State Comptroller released a special audit report entitled "Local Authorities' Preparedness for Fires, Their Performance During the Fires in November 2016, Compensation to the Injured and Costs to the Economy"² (the previous report or previous audit). The previous audit was conducted in response to the widespread fires that affected the country in November 2016, which represented one of the most severe episodes in terms of property and environmental damage, with its intensity and distinctive characteristics placing many residents at risk. Since the previous audit, published in 2018, several significant forest fires have occurred in Israel³. Moreover, following the onset of the Iron Swords War, the confluence of wartime and civilian emergencies has resulted in the destruction of approximately 200,000 dunams of forest and woodland in northern Israel within less than a year, leading considerable damage to nature reserves and negatively impacting local fauna and flora.

- 1 National Emergency Authority, "Foundational Concept: Response to Emergency Events in the Civil Space of the State of Israel" (October 2021).
- 2 State Comptroller, **Special Audit Report – Local Authorities' Preparedness for Fires, Their Performance During the Fires in November 2016, Compensation to the Injured and Costs to the Economy** (2018).
- 3 In May 2019, for example, thousands of dunams were burned in forest fires in the center of the country; in August 2021, forest areas of about 11,000 dunams burned in the Judean Mountains; in April 2025, about 30,000 dunams burned in a wave of fires in the Judean Mountains.



In April 2025, after the audit end date, a series of significant wildfires broke out in the Judean Mountains. This prompted the preemptive evacuation of adjacent communities. The wildfires inflicted damage on both flora and fauna and resulted in substantial harm to ecosystems. In May 2025, the State Comptroller and Ombudsman addressed a letter to the Prime Minister concerning the readiness for managing emergency situations pertaining to fire services. The State Comptroller emphasized in his correspondence that the recent wildfire incidents should serve as a catalyst for the government's comprehensive preparedness strategies in response to such events.



Key Figures

56%

Of all fire events in Israel in 2020–2024 broke out in open areas (forest and woodland)

28,500

Fires on average broke out annually in 2020–2024 in open areas (forest and woodland), of which an average of 50 per year were significant forest fires. In 2024, about 33,500 fires broke out.

17,400

Fire incidents were handled by the Fire Authority during the Iron Swords War in the northern arena (from January to October 2024). 735 of them were caused by weaponry that was fired.

583

Areas (localities and neighborhoods) are subject to the threat of forest and woodland fires at different risk levels (risk zones). 81 areas are at the highest risk level.

NIS 155 million

National cost estimate by the National Emergency Authority (NEMA) for establishing buffer zones in risk areas – three times the amount budgeted in Government Resolution 1091 (NIS 54.6 million, by 2026).

Only 9 out of 81

Areas at the highest risk level were budgeted for, under Government Resolution 1091 (NIS 27.5 million, about half of the total budget of the resolution).

NIS 12 million


The amount allocated for the creation of buffer zones in three risk areas in Haifa that were included in the agreement to establish buffer zones, in accordance with Government Resolution 1091.

8

The number of enclosed neighborhoods in Haifa (neighborhoods with a single entrance and exit for vehicles) to which access routes have not yet been added despite the recommendations in the previous report.




Audit Actions


 From September to December 2024, the Office of the State Comptroller conducted a follow-up audit of the previous report. In this follow-up audit, the Office of the State Comptroller examined the actions taken to rectify the key deficiencies in fire preparedness identified in the previous report (follow-up audit). Additionally, the Office of the State Comptroller investigated new issues that were not addressed in the previous report, specifically the utilization of technological resources and the implementation of informational activities for residents regarding fire management. Moreover, the follow-up report includes an international review pertaining to fire management.

The follow-up audit was executed in two local authorities that were examined in the previous audit: the **Haifa** Municipality and the **Zikhron Ya'akov** Local Council, as well as the **Yokne'am Illit** Municipality, which had not been examined previously (the local authorities examined). Certain aspects of the **Mateh Yehuda** Regional Council were also examined. Supplementary inspections were carried out at the Ministry of National Security (formerly the Ministry of Public Security), the National Fire and Rescue Authority (the Fire Authority), the Ministry of Interior, and the Carmel Waters Ltd. (Carmel Waters) and Valley Springs Ltd. (Valley Springs) water corporations.

Key Findings



 **Gaps in Preparedness for Fire-Fighting along the Confrontation Line in the North During the Iron Swords War** – In the course of the State Comptroller's touring of localities along the confrontation line, significant gaps and challenges were identified regarding preparedness for extinguishing fires resulting from rocket strikes or unmanned aerial vehicles. Notably, certain fires remained completely unaddressed by firefighting teams, there was an absence of aerial support for fire suppression, and no suitable alternative response existed for extinguishing fires in regions where aerial firefighting was infeasible. Additionally, firefighting teams arrived at fire locations only for brief intervals, leaving local emergency teams to manage the blazes, often without adequate training and resources. This context was further complicated by the operational risks faced by firefighting personnel amid an active state of war.

 **Promotion of Regulations for Protecting Localities from Fires** – The previous audit indicated that the draft regulations and rules aimed at safeguarding localities from fire hazards, which were disseminated by the then Minister of Public Security, were not



approved by the Minister of Interior due to the absence of a budgetary provision for the establishment of buffer zones within local authorities. The follow-up audit found that this deficiency was **not rectified**. Furthermore, the Ministry of National Security had not advanced the matters of cost assessment and requisite budgeting, while the draft regulations, which include, *inter alia*, mandates for the preparation of protection plans intended to create a fire protection envelope and to establish buffer zones within protected localities⁴, had not received approval as of the audit end date.

Formulation of a National Plan and Allocation of Budgets Pursuant to Government Resolution 1091 – It was revealed that, despite Government Resolution 1091 of 2022, which called for the development of a comprehensive national plan to address fire-related issues and to enhance budgetary sources for buffer zone establishment, the actions taken by the Ministry of National Security, tasked with implementing the government resolution, were limited. Other than the approval of a list of 20 risk zones (out of a total of 583) and the allocation of budgets for nine of these zones, the Ministry of National Security did not pursue the creation of a long-term national plan, prioritize implementation efforts, or expand budgetary allocations. It was determined that the funding provided under the government resolution (NIS 54.6 million) constituted only approximately one-third of the estimated national costs associated with NEMA's buffer zone initiatives, which totaled an estimated cost of NIS 155 million.

The Fire Authority Guidelines (Document of Principles) – The previous audit indicated that, pending the approval of draft regulations aimed at safeguarding localities from fire hazards by the pertinent authorities within the Fire Authority Law, including the Ministry of Interior, the Fire Authority is advising local authorities to adhere to the Document of Principles, despite the non-binding nature of these guidelines. The follow-up audit revealed that this deficiency has **not been rectified**. The regulations have yet to receive approval, and the status of the Fire Authority's guidelines for local authorities remains unregulated, resulting in a continued lack of binding force, whereby each authority acts according to its own discretion and capacity.

Preparation of a Fire Protection Plan – It was discovered that, in contravention of the Fire Authority's guidelines, the **Haifa** Municipality failed to develop a protection plan for two high-risk neighborhoods: Neve Sha'anani and Kiryat Sprinzak. Furthermore, it was found that the Municipality had not formulated a protection plan for 23 additional neighborhoods identified in the Municipality's master plan as requiring the establishment of buffer zones within their boundaries. The **Zikhron Ya'akov** Local Council formulated a protection plan for the Council but did not establish timelines for addressing the buffer zones. The **Yokne'am Illit** Municipality initiated the preparation of a protection plan

4 Protected locality – a locality that is part of a regional council, local council, municipality, or a complex of buildings that are not part of a locality, which has a contact area (buffer zone) between it and the forest, and which the Fire Commissioner has determined that due to its proximity to the forest, it is at risk of harm as a result of a forest fire.



after the conclusion of the audit; however, this plan has not yet been submitted for approval by the Fire Authority.







Preparation of Buffer Zones, Including Access Routes for Rescue Forces – The previous audit indicated that the **Haifa** Municipality began the preparation of buffer zones only following a series of fires at the beginning of 2017. The follow-up audit found that the deficiency was **rectified to a small extent** in the neighborhoods of Kababir, Kabirim, Carmelia, Ramat Almogi, and Ramat Begin, which were incorporated into the agreement between the Ministry of National Security and the Haifa Municipality for the establishment of buffer zones, in accordance with Government Resolution 1091 (the Pilot Agreement). However, by the audit end date, the preparation of the buffer zones had not yet commenced. The deficiency was **not rectified** in four neighborhoods in Haifa, where inspections were conducted by the Fire Authority – Derech Ha'Yam, Neve Sha'anani, Kiryat Sprinzak, and Ramot Remez – which were assessed as being at high risk of fires, and for which the Fire Authority recommended that the Municipality formulate a protection plan. Additionally, there are 22 other neighborhoods where the Municipality's master plan indicated the need for buffer zones to be prepared. The previous audit revealed that the **Zikhron Ya'akov** Local Council had indeed begun implementing the lessons learned following the wave of fires; however, in light of the risks posed by forest fires, it could not afford to neglect the comprehensive and systematic treatment of community protection against forest and woodland fires. The follow-up audit identified that the deficiency had been **rectified to a small extent**, with the **Zikhron Ya'akov** Local Council having developed a work plan; nevertheless, the preparation of buffer zones had only been completed for three of the 27 land areas surrounding the locality as delineated in its work plan.



The Mateh Yehuda Regional Council – The previous audit revealed that the **Mateh Yehuda** Regional Council failed to implement the guidelines established by the Fire Authority and did not collaborate with the localities of **Bet Me'ir** and **Nataf** to ensure compliance with these guidelines, including the establishment of buffer zones and the preparation of a fire protection plan, nor did it allocate a budget for their implementation. The follow-up audit indicated that the deficiency was **rectified to a small extent**, with the **Mateh Yehuda** Regional Council allocating approximately NIS 3 million in budgets from 2022 to 2024 to the Council's localities, including **Bet Me'ir** and **Nataf**, for fire preparedness purposes. However, the Council reported that it does not monitor the actions of local committees in **Bet Me'ir** and **Nataf** regarding the implementation of the Fire Authority's guidelines and lacks documentation pertaining to their actions to prevent fires, prepare fire protection plans, or establish buffer zones, except for actions that received budget allocation from the Council. By May 2025, the Council had not produced any documentation for the audit regarding the current status of buffer zone preparations around **Bet Me'ir** and **Nataf**, nor regarding the actions still required in these localities.



-  **Fire Prevention Actions in Privately-Held Areas** – The previous audit indicated that the **Haifa** Municipality did not enforce the requirement for residents to establish buffer zones in privately-held areas. The follow-up audit found that this deficiency has **not been rectified**, with the **Haifa** Municipality informing the audit team that it had not taken enforcement action against residents who failed to implement fire prevention measures in their private properties in accordance with the Fire Authority's directive. Additionally, the **Yokne'am Illit** Municipality reported to the audit team that it had not engaged with residents to establish buffer zones in privately-held areas.
-  **Establishing Access Roads and Escape Routes** – The previous audit indicated that the **Haifa** Municipality was in the process of implementing an access route to one of the nine enclosed neighborhoods within its jurisdiction. The follow-up audit revealed this deficiency was **partially rectified**; as of the audit date, there were eight enclosed neighborhoods in Haifa and, of these, two neighborhoods had access routes currently in the implementation phase; in two neighborhoods, plans for additional access routes had received approval, yet a funding source had not been identified; in three neighborhoods, the access roads were at various stages of planning; and in one neighborhood, the Municipality opted not to pave an additional access road at this stage.
-  **Maintenance of Fire Hydrants** – The previous audit revealed that the Fire Authority did not conduct inspections of fire hydrants in accordance with the obligations outlined in the Water Supply Regulations. The follow-up audit indicated that this deficiency had been **rectified to a small extent**, with the Fire Authority performing sample inspections of fire hydrants only in areas categorized as high fire risk. This practice does not comply with the Fire Authority's directive issued in July 2024 concerning "Hydrant Inspection (Fire Hydrants)", which stipulates that the territorial commanders of the Fire Authority are responsible for regularly inspecting all public fire hydrants within their districts.
-  **Public Awareness Initiatives for Residents and the Utilization of Technological Tools** – The international review indicates that public awareness and training efforts, alongside the deployment of advanced technologies for the early detection and prediction of fires, are essential in addressing fire incidents. These measures have demonstrated efficacy globally in mitigating the risk of fire proliferation. In contrast, in Israel, public awareness initiatives and the application of technologies within the Fire Authority and the local authorities examined – namely, **Haifa, Zikhron Ya'akov, and Yokne'am Illit** – are in the nascent stages. It was observed that the local authorities examined lack structured plans for implementing public awareness activities targeting residents in high-risk zones. Moreover, their application of advanced technologies for the early detection of fires is limited, primarily relying on standard cameras capable of smoke detection, rather than cameras dedicated to fire detection. Furthermore, it was noted that the Fire Authority possesses limited technological resources for predicting and early detection of fires (such as drones and fire spread indices) compared to the advanced technological solutions currently available globally enabling early detection of fires (such as remote sensing systems and the application of artificial intelligence tools).







Preparation of a Fire Protection Plan – The previous audit indicated that the **Haifa** Municipality and the **Zikhron Ya'akov** Local Council had not developed a fire protection plan. The follow-up audit revealed that this deficiency has been **rectified to a great extent**. In August 2023, the **Haifa** Municipality formulated a master plan for buffer zones within the city, which served as the foundation for the development of a protection plan for nine neighborhoods identified by the Fire Authority as being at high risk for fires during the period from September to December 2023. In July 2021, the **Zikhron Ya'akov** Local Council prepared a protection plan that includes a work plan.

Preparation of Buffer Zones, Including Access Routes for Rescue Forces – The previous audit found that the **Haifa** Municipality initiated the preparation of buffer zones only after the onset of the wave of fires at the beginning of 2017. The follow-up audit indicated that the deficiency has been **rectified to a great extent** in the neighborhoods of Hod HaCarmel (Denia), Savyonei HaCarmel, and Ramat Golda. These neighborhoods were included in a Pilot Agreement established between the **Haifa** Municipality and the Ministry of National Security in December 2022 to create buffer zones in accordance with Government Resolution 1091, for which a budget of NIS 12 million has been designated. The preparation of these buffer zones is currently in progress and is anticipated to be finalized by the end of the first half of 2025.








Water Pooling in the Local Authorities – The previous audit revealed that the volume of water pooling in the Carmel Ridge is insufficient to adequately address a large-scale fire, necessitating prompt action to plan and implement the connection of an additional water source and the establishment of essential storage ponds in Haifa. The follow-up audit found that this deficiency has been **largely rectified**, with the Zemer Water Center in **Haifa** currently in advanced construction phase, poised for commission and operation in the forthcoming months. Furthermore, the previous audit indicated that there was no emergency generator at the pumping station in **Zikhron Ya'akov** during a fire, which halted the filling of the water storage pool and raised concerns regarding the continuity of the water supply for firefighting efforts. The follow-up audit confirmed that this deficiency has been **fully rectified**, and the upgrade of the Founders Pumping Stations – Merkaz HaMoshava and Givat Eden in **Zikhron Ya'akov** – was completed in September 2020.



Key Recommendations


-  Given the risks to communities situated near or within forests from fires that could endanger human life and property, the Ministry of National Security and the Ministry of Interior, whose consent is required for the establishment of regulations regarding open areas under the jurisdiction of local authorities, must collaborate to enact life-saving regulations aimed at safeguarding communities from fires.
-  The Ministry of National Security, charged with the implementation of Government Resolution 1091, must undertake the formulation of a comprehensive multi-year national strategy addressing fire management, as well as advocate for an increase in the allocated budget in accordance with the government resolution.
-  Despite the absence of an explicit, codified obligation to devise a protective plan, it is incumbent upon local authorities, given their responsibility for the safety of residents and the prevention of fires within their jurisdiction, to adhere to established professional guidelines provided by the Fire Authority. The **Haifa** Municipality is tasked with preparing fire protection plans for all neighborhoods designated by the Fire Authority as requiring such plans. Furthermore, it is advisable for the **Haifa** Municipality, in cooperation with the Fire Authority, to assess the necessity of creating protection plans for additional neighborhoods that, according to the municipal master plan, warrant the establishment of buffer zones. The **Zikhron Ya'akov** Local Council should establish timelines for the execution of the work plan it has devised for the creation of buffer zones and ensure adherence to those timelines. The **Yokne'am Illit** Municipality must complete the development of its fire protection plan and submit it for the Fire Authority's approval.
-  In light of the critical significance of buffer zones in mitigating the spread and intensity of fires, and in minimizing risks to human life and property, as well as facilitating the evacuation of residents, both the Ministry of National Security and the Fire Authority should undertake initiatives to establish buffer zones in line with the classification of fire-prone areas. The **Haifa** Municipality and the **Zikhron Ya'akov** Local Council ought to recognize the pressing nature of the issue and act promptly to create buffer zones within their jurisdictions. It is recommended that the **Haifa** Municipality and the **Zikhron Ya'akov** Local Council actively promote the establishment of buffer zones, including access routes for emergency response teams. The **Haifa** Municipality should prioritize actions in alignment with its master plan and the Fire Authority's directives, while the **Zikhron Ya'akov** Local Council should strive to prepare buffer zones in the remaining 24 designated areas surrounding the locality and provide ongoing updates to the Fire Authority regarding the prepared buffer zones. It is also advised that the Fire Authority oversee the execution of the protection plan approved in 2021 for the **Zikhron Ya'akov** Local Council, as well as monitor the Council's efforts to establish buffer zones.



-  The **Mateh Yehuda** Regional Council, as the governing body responsible for its residents' safety, must ensure the implementation of all requisite measures to prepare the localities in its jurisdiction for fire emergencies, adhering to the Fire Authority's guidelines. The immediacy of these actions is underscored by the heightened risks posed to the **Mateh Yehuda** Regional Council localities, as evidenced by the recent fires occurring in April 2025 within the Council's jurisdiction.
-  In consideration of the risks faced by residents of the enclosed neighborhoods in **Haifa** during emergencies necessitating evacuation, the **Haifa** Municipality must persist in efforts to construct an additional access route within all enclosed neighborhoods, specifically including the Ramat Hen neighborhood.
-  In addition to the inspection of fire hydrants by the Fire Authority in high-risk fire areas across **Haifa, Zikhron Ya'akov, and Yokne'am Illit**, comprehensive inspections of all fire hydrants should be conducted by the Fire Authority. Any malfunctions identified should be reported to water suppliers in accordance with the directive on "Hydrant Inspection (Fire Hydrants)".
-  It is recommended that the local authorities, in collaboration with the Fire Authority, develop and implement a systematic plan for conducting informational initiatives aimed at residents. Enhancing such informational activities will augment resident awareness and preparedness, thereby reducing potential risks and damages in the event of a fire or fire spread.
-  It is recommended that the Fire Authority enhance and refine its remote sensing technologies and examine the integration of advanced solutions utilizing artificial intelligence to improve operational capabilities and fire preparedness.
-  It is recommended that the local authorities examined – **Haifa, Zikhron Ya'akov, and Yokne'am Illit** – undertake initiatives to promote the utilization of existing technological means that facilitate remote sensing, including sensors and dedicated cameras, to enable the early detection of fires.
-  In alignment with Government Resolution 1891, it is advisable that the Ministry of National Security and the Fire Authority engage in a needs assessment with the Conflict Zone Forum of localities situated along conflict lines in the north and south, ensuring that the implemented plan (the "Chariots of Fire" project) addresses identified needs, and subsequently act to fulfill those requirements.



Fire Scars in Northern Israel, October 7, 2023 – September 11, 2024



Source: Fire Authority, October 2024.



Summary

Addressing significant and large-scale emergency events within the civil home front of the State of Israel, during both wartime and peacetime, requires proactive systemic and inter-organizational preparation by multiple entities and the consolidation of national resources. Local authorities assume a critical role in the preparedness of the civil home front for all emergency situations, encompassing civil emergencies such as forest and woodland fires.

The follow-up audit indicated that the regulations pertaining to the safeguarding of localities from forest fires remain unapproved due to the absence of a budgetary source for their execution. Further, the follow-up audit found that Government Resolution 1091 of 2022 allocated funding for only nine areas, while the budget for other high-risk areas remains unregulated. The local authorities examined – **Haifa** and **Zikhron Ya'akov** – have undertaken measures to address the deficiencies identified in the previous report, which include the formulation of fire protection plans and the establishment of buffer zones, either within the purview of Government Resolution 1091 and its associated budgets or through initiatives they independently initiated. However, as at the follow-up audit end date, it was observed that buffer zones had not been established in extensive areas designated by the Fire Authority as being at high-risk for forest and woodland fires within the **Haifa** Municipality and the **Zikhron Ya'akov** Local Council. The **Yokne'am Illit** Municipality initiated the development of a protection plan subsequent to the audit; however, this plan had not yet been submitted for approval to the Fire Authority. Furthermore, the **Haifa** Municipality had established access and evacuation routes in only one enclosed neighborhood.

Given the critical importance of implementing buffer zones to curtail the advancement of fire fronts, facilitate the evacuation of residents, decrease the risk of property damage, and protect human lives, it is imperative that the Ministry of National Security, the Fire Authority, the **Haifa** Municipality, and the **Zikhron Ya'akov** Local Council acknowledge the significance of this issue and prioritize the expeditious preparation of buffer zones in Haifa and Zikhron Ya'akov. Additionally, the government ministries and all relevant entities, including the Ministry of National Security and the Ministry of Interior, must collaborate to formulate regulatory measures aimed at safeguarding communities from fire hazards, which constitute essential life-saving regulations.



The Degree of Rectification of the Key Deficiencies Revealed in the Previous Report

The Audit Chapter	The Audited Body	The Deficiency Noted in the Previous Audit	The Extent of Deficiencies Rectification Noted in the Follow-up Audit			
			Not Rectified	Slightly Rectified	Significantly Rectified	Fully Rectified
Approval of regulations and rules for protecting localities from fires	The Ministry of National Security and the Ministry of Interior	The draft regulations and rules for protecting localities from fires were not approved due to the lack of a budgetary source for establishing buffer zones in local authorities				
Preparing a fire protection plan	The Haifa Municipality and the Zikhron Ya'akov Local Council	The municipality and council did not prepare a fire protection plan				
Preparing buffer zones, including access routes for rescue forces	The Haifa Municipality ⁵	Only after the wave of fires, at the beginning of 2017, did the municipality begin preparing buffer zones				
	The Zikhron Ya'akov Local Council	The council did not prepare a systematic plan for implementing the Fire Authority's guidelines and left the issue of protecting the locality from fires without comprehensive and systematic treatment				

⁵ Rectified to a great extent for the neighborhoods of Hod HaCarmel (Denia), Savyonei HaCarmel and Ramat Golda (neighborhoods included in the Pilot Agreement). See details of the correction of the deficiency in Haifa by neighborhood in Table 7 in the chapter "Establishment of buffer zones, including access routes for rescue forces".



The Audit Chapter	The Audited Body	The Deficiency Noted in the Previous Audit	The Extent of Deficiencies Rectification Noted in the Follow-up Audit			
			Not Rectified	Slightly Rectified	Significantly Rectified	Fully Rectified
Preparing a fire protection plan; preparing buffer zones including access routes for rescue forces	The Mateh Yehuda Regional Council	The council did not work with the localities of Bet Me'ir and Nataf to ensure that they were implementing the Fire Authority's guidelines, including establishing buffer zones and preparing a fire protection plan, and did not allocate them a budget for their implementation				
Fire prevention measures in private areas	The Haifa Municipality	The municipality did not take enforcement action against residents who did not comply with the requirement to establish buffer zones on private property				
Preparation of access roads and escape routes	The Haifa Municipality	Nine enclosed neighborhoods were found within the municipality's boundaries, and it was in the process of constructing an access route to one of them				



The Audit Chapter	The Audited Body	The Deficiency Noted in the Previous Audit	The Extent of Deficiencies Rectification Noted in the Follow-up Audit			
			Not Rectified	Slightly Rectified	Significantly Rectified	Fully Rectified
Fire hydrant maintenance	The Fire Authority	The Authority did not conduct inspections of the fire hydrants according to the obligation stipulated in the Water Supply Regulations				
Water pooling in local authorities	The Haifa Municipality Carmel Waters Corporation	The volume of water storage in the Carmel Ridge does not provide a sufficient response to a large-scale fire, and it is necessary to act as soon as possible to plan and implement the connection of an additional water source and to establish the necessary storage ponds				
	The Zikhron Ya'akov Local Council and the Valley Springs Corporation	At the time of the fire, there was no emergency generator at the pumping station in Zikhron Ya'akov, and as a result, the filling of the water in the storage pool was stopped, raising concerns about disruption of the water supply for firefighting purposes				



Fire Scars in Northern Israel, October 7, 2023 – September 11, 2024

