



State Comptroller
of Israel

Civil Defense and Shelters in Local Authorities

▪ December 2025 ▪



Civil Defense and Shelters in Local Authorities

Abstract

Background

Following the surprise attack by Hamas on October 7, 2023, and continuing until November 2024, more than 27,000 lethal missiles, rockets, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were launched towards the territory of the State of Israel, resulting in loss of life and damage to buildings and infrastructure. By the end of November 2024, at least 63 Israeli and foreign citizens had become fatalities of missile and rocket fire. Physical protection, which establishes a buffer between this threat and the population, aims to minimize physical harm to individuals and the number of casualties, thereby contributing to the preservation of lives. The implementation of physical protection measures for the entire population of the State of Israel is a prerequisite for effectively addressing the threat posed by missiles and rockets. In addition to safeguarding the population, these measures facilitate the maintenance of emergency routines and the provision of essential services to residents. This protective framework includes, among other components, the following measures: protected rooms within each apartment or on every floor of an apartment building; private home shelters; communal shelters constructed on the ground floor or in the basement of residential apartment buildings; public (mass) shelters located within residential areas, designed to serve local residents as well as individuals seeking refuge during emergencies; and additional public refuge spaces.

The Home Front Command (HFC) holds primary authority for the preparation and execution of the country's civil defense plans, serving as a competent authority under the Civil Defense Law, 1951 (the Civil Defense Law). In relation to sheltering, it is responsible for the engineering requirements for the design and construction of shelters, both public and private. Furthermore, the HFC has the authority to instruct local authorities to ensure the installation of private shelters and their appropriate maintenance by homeowners and owners of various enterprises.

Key Figures

About 3.2 million Israeli residents

(33.6%) do not have protected spaces meeting required standards, as of January 2025

About 42,000 residents (18%)

in communities located up to 9 km from the border with Syria and Lebanon, do not have protected spaces meeting required standards, as of January 2025

1,378 (about 11.7%)

of the public shelters in Israel are unfit for use, according to Home Front Command data as of January 2025

Only 37

of the 11,776 public shelters in Israel (0.3%) are situated within the jurisdictions of local authorities representing Arab society. Furthermore, 8 of these shelters do not meet the required standards

More than 466,000 students (25%)

learned daily at a school without protected spaces meeting required standards, as of March 2024

A total of NIS 1.406 billion

was allocated to the Home Front Command for the implementation of the "Northern Shield" plan in the years 2019–2024, although in order to fully implement the plan, it was necessary to allocate NIS 3 billion in these years. The implementation of the budgets was also partial and by the end of 2024 amounted to about half of the amount allocated

Only NIS 2.7 million (21%)

of the NIS 12.63 million set in the government resolution, was transferred by the government ministries to the Ashkelon Municipality in 2022–2023

NIS 56 million and NIS 50 million

allocated by the Ministry of Construction and Housing for grants and loans for "assistance with apartment protection solutions in Ashkelon" for the years 2022 and 2023, respectively, were not utilized until mid-2023 due to a delay in publishing the procedure for receiving them

Audit Actions



Between March and November 2024, the Office of the State Comptroller conducted an examination regarding the issues of civil defense and sheltering in five local authorities: the municipalities of Ashkelon, Giv'atayim, and Holon, the Bi'na Local Council, and the Gilboa Regional Council (hereinafter - 'the local authorities examined'), as well as within the Bedouin areas in the Negev region. Additional evaluations were carried out at the Home Front Command, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Construction and Housing, and the Authority for Development and Settlement of the Bedouin in the Negev. Furthermore, pursuant to a request from the State Audit Committee from June 4, 2024, the State Comptroller was directed to prepare an opinion pursuant to Section 21 of the State Comptroller Law, 5718-1958 [Consolidated Version], in which the Office of the State Comptroller assessed the decision made by the Ministry of Social Equality and the Advancement of the Status of Women to terminate the situation room (emergency center) dedicated to supporting Arab society.

Key Findings



Mapping the Protection Gaps and the Activities of the Home Front Command to Examine the Local Authorities' Responses – The situation revealed by the audit attests to a concerning reality in which, as of January 2025, approximately one-third of Israeli citizens lack adequate protection against missile attacks. Specifically, around 3.2 million residents (33.6%) are without protective measures complying with required standards, including 42,575 residents situated in communities within 7–20 kilometers of the Gaza Strip. This gap in protection is exacerbated by the evolving security landscape characterized by persistent threats of missile fire from multiple fronts. Rather than addressing the shortcomings in response to the protection gaps identified in 2018, the Home Front Command opted to suspend the implementation of the second phase of the local authorities' protection plan ('TAMIR') (formulation of responses by local authorities), and did not continue its implementation extensively and proactively in local authorities, and without the advancement of an alternative plan to fulfill its obligation to regulate and enhance the security of residents. The audit conducted revealed that none of the local authorities examined were aware of the Home Front Command's decision to halt Phase B of the protection

plan. Furthermore, the Home Front Command decreed in 2018 that it would not approve the local authorities' TAMIR plans.

The Office of the State Comptroller has made clear to the Home Front Command that it is inappropriate for it to have refrained from approving the TAMIR plans of local authorities for approximately seven years, thereby leaving the responsibility for resident protection to the voluntary discretion of local authorities without providing explicit guidance to the authorities in the field for which it is accountable.



The Actions Undertaken by the Local Authorities Examined to Map Protection Gaps and Promote Protection Solutions – In the municipalities of **Giv'atayim** and **Holon**, as well as in the **Bi'na** Local Council, the number of residents lacking protection meeting required standards (some of the data is based on building permit data and not on actual construction) was: 10,163 (16%) in **Giv'atayim**, 26,895 (14%) in **Holon** and 6,167 (77%) in **Bi'na**. Notably, the **Ashkelon** Municipality and the **Gilboa** Regional Council lack data concerning the number of residents without standard protection, even though such data is a requirement specified in the master file regarding emergency preparations for municipalities and local councils¹. Furthermore, the **Bi'na** Local Council and the **Gilboa** Regional Council have not established databases reflecting actual construction pertaining to protection gaps, nor have they mapped all protected spaces within their jurisdictions as mandated by the master files². Additionally, the local authorities of **Ashkelon**, **Bi'na**, and **Gilboa** have not devised protection solutions for their populations during emergencies, in accordance with the requirements outlined in the master files. The proposed solutions by the local authorities of **Giv'atayim** and **Holon** for residents lacking protection do not provide clarity regarding the accessibility of public shelters in relation to residents' homes, particularly concerning the timeliness of access during warning periods. It was also observed that the Home Front Command failed to supervise the implementation of its directives as per the master files and did not ensure that local authorities developed protective solutions tailored to meet the needs of the population in emergency situations. The local authorities of **Ashkelon**, **Bi'na**, and **Gilboa** have not established mass shelters in underground parking facilities or public buildings for residents lacking standard protection, as mandated by the Protection Guide and the directives of the Home Front Command regarding the "preparation of a mass shelter file". Moreover, the local authorities of **Ashkelon**, **Giv'atayim**, and **Gilboa** did not provide clear indications on their websites regarding which public shelters are located underground versus above ground; the **Ashkelon** Municipality did not disclose the accessibility of these shelters for individuals with disabilities, and the municipalities of **Giv'atayim** and **Holon** did not publish a list of underground public parking facilities designated as emergency public shelters. In the Bedouin areas in the Negev, where

¹ Issued by the Ministry of Interior, the National Emergency Management Authority within the Ministry of Defense, the Home Front Command, the Federation of Local Government in Israel, and the Federation of Regional Authorities in Israel.

² A master file was issued for regional councils as well.

approximately 165,000 residents inhabit unregulated structures, there was a complete absence of shelters until the onset of the Swords of Iron War. Following the outbreak of the war and until January 2025, approximately 135 shelters and 64 "Hesco" bastions were established throughout the Bedouin area.



Local Authorities' Protection Plan (TAMIR) – While the master files concerning preparedness stipulate that local authorities are responsible for the preparation of local protection plans, the audit revealed that the **Bi'na** Local Council and the **Gilboa** Regional Council failed to develop a local authority protection plan. Conversely, the **Ashkelon** Municipality prepared a partial protection plan, whereas the municipalities of **Giv'atayim** and **Holon** produced plans; however, the **Holon** Municipality protection plan did not receive the Home Front Command's approval. Moreover, the **Gilboa** Regional Council did not incorporate information layers pertaining to security and emergency matters into its geographic information systems, resulting in the absence of vital data regarding the locations of public shelters, portable bomb shelters (Migunit), and protected spaces within educational institutions. The **Bi'na** Local Council lacks a municipal geographic information system. Additionally, within the geographic information system of the Bet Ha'Kerem Valley Local Planning and Building Committee, which encompasses Bi'na, no information layers pertaining to security and emergency issues were identified. This includes the absence of data regarding the locations of protected spaces within the jurisdiction of the **Bi'na** Local Council, as stipulated by the guidelines for the preparation of a local authority protection plan issued by the Home Front Command in March 2010.



Monitoring of Shelters in Residential Apartment Buildings – The specifications in the guidelines for the maintenance of shelters, published by the Home Front Command in July 2019 and revised in June 2024, specify that the frequency of inspections for the majority of shelter components should range from three months to annually. Nonetheless, it was observed that between 2021 and 2023, the municipalities of **Ashkelon**, **Giv'atayim**, and **Holon** did not perform proactive inspections of residential apartment buildings with the mandated frequency regarding the maintenance of shelters. At the same time, the Home Front Command has not exercised its oversight authority and has refrained from monitoring the actions of local authorities.



Inspections by Local Authorities in Public Shelters – The **Ashkelon** Municipality lacks documentation of inspections related to the maintenance of public shelters conducted during the years 2021 to 2023. In the **Gilboa** Regional Council, no records were discovered that would indicate an inspection of the maintenance status of the shelters under its jurisdiction subsequent to the inspection conducted by the Home Front Command in 2021, leaving uncertainty regarding the rectification of identified deficiencies. The **Holon** Municipality did not carry out any inspections of public shelter maintenance from January 2021 to November 2022; however, in 2023, the Municipality undertook inspections of all 64 public shelters within its jurisdiction.



Inspections of the Home Front Command of Public Shelters – It was ascertained that 11.7% of public shelters in Israel are deemed uninhabitable. Furthermore, according to data provided by Home Front Command, only 37 out of 11,775 public shelters (0.3%) are situated within the jurisdiction of local authorities serving Arab society; of these 37 shelters, 8 do not meet required standards. In **Ashkelon**, the Home Front Command conducted inspections in 2021 and 2022 on only 2 and 9 of the 142 shelters, respectively. Notably, no audits were performed in **Giv'atayim** during the years 2021 and 2023, in **Gilboa** during 2022 and 2023, and in **Holon** during 2022.



The Expenditures of the Local Authorities Examined on the Maintenance and Renovation of Public Shelters – From the beginning of 2021 until the onset of the war in October 2023, both the **Ashkelon** Municipality and the **Gilboa** Regional Council allocated minimal financial resources towards the maintenance and renovation of public shelters and shelters in educational institutions, amounting to averages of NIS 417,000 and 176,000 per annum, respectively. It was only subsequent to the commencement of hostilities that these localities substantially increased their investments to NIS 1.947 million and 1.793 million, reflecting increases of 4.6 times and 10 times, respectively. Similarly, the **Giv'atayim** Municipality invested limited amounts from the beginning of 2021 until the outbreak of the war in October 2023. During this time period, the **Holon** Municipality refrained from investing in the renovation of protective spaces within schools and kindergartens, focusing solely on their maintenance. Following the onset of the war, the **Giv'atayim** and **Holon** municipalities devoted NIS 59.4 million and 12.284 million, respectively, towards the construction and enhancement of shelters in kindergartens and schools.



Audit Findings of the Office of the State Comptroller from Inspections of Public Shelters – Inspections of 26 public shelters within the jurisdictions of **Ashkelon**, **Giv'atayim**, **Holon**, and **Gilboa** revealed various deficiencies in their maintenance. The identified issues included blocked escape hatches, failure to install exit ladders near escape hatches, absence of electricity within the shelters, dampness in walls and ceilings, exposed electrical wires, lack of emergency exit signage, waterlogged and unusable shelters, debris accumulation, malfunctioning emergency exit doors with rust, insufficient connections to water infrastructure and sewage systems, absence of emergency lighting, and lack of fluorescent color signage indicating the shelter entrance and emergency exits.



Protection Gaps in Educational Institutions in Israel – As of March 2024, data from the Ministry of Education indicates that the rate of students lacking standard protection in 94% of schools across Israel stood at 25%. This statistic implies that over 466,000 students attended school daily without access to standard protection. The audit conducted in August 2024, found that the Ministry of Education had no data regarding standard protection in 10,975 out of 21,419 kindergarten classrooms (approximately 51%),

and noted that 2,548 of 5,530 daycare centers (46%) lacked standard protection in the 2023/24 school year.



Protection Gaps in Educational Institutions within the Local Authorities Examined – It was found that more than 66% of students within the **Bi'na** Local Council were not afforded protection meeting required standards; this includes two elementary schools and one secondary school which completely lack designated protected spaces. In the other local authorities examined (**Ashkelon**, **Giv'atayim**, **Gilboa**, and **Holon**), the total gaps in protection for schools ranged from 11% in **Ashkelon** to 41% in **Gilboa**, with the number of students attending these schools daily without standard protection ranging from 3,294 in **Ashkelon** to 6,393 in **Holon**. The proportion of students without standard protection in kindergartens within **Ashkelon**, **Bi'na**, **Giv'atayim**, **Gilboa**, and **Holon** ranged from 17% in **Giv'atayim** to 52% in **Gilboa**, with the total number of unprotected students in kindergartens across these authorities ranging from 98 in **Bi'na** to 3,206 in **Holon**.



Studies in Educational Institutions within the Local Authorities Examined During the War – The absence of standard protection significantly impacted the operational continuity of educational institutions in the local authorities examined. In certain schools located in **Ashkelon**, **Bi'na**, **Giv'atayim**, and **Holon**, students were compelled to attend school only part of the week for periods ranging from three weeks to two months (as observed in the schools situated in **Bi'na**). Notably, in **Ashkelon**, kindergarten children, students in grades 4–6, and all secondary school classes did not utilize the educational buildings for instruction during the initial 22 days following the Municipality's designation as a yellow zone.



Maintenance of Shelters in Educational Institutions within the Local Authorities Examined – The municipalities of **Ashkelon** and **Giv'atayim**, as well as the **Gilboa** Regional Council, failed to ensure the proper functioning of shelters and protected spaces within their educational institutions as stipulated by the Ministry of Education's emergency procedures. Notable deficiencies in maintenance included the absence of adequate window marking with fluorescent paint, insufficient signage, exposed electrical wiring, lack of emergency lighting, absence of first aid kits, misuse of the shelter as a storage area, equipment blocking emergency exits, malfunctioning fire extinguishers, and moisture issues in the shelters. Between the years 2021 and 2023, the **Ashkelon** Municipality did not conduct required inspections of shelters and emergency equipment within schools and kindergartens under its jurisdiction, while the **Giv'atayim** Municipality similarly neglected such inspections from 2022 to 2023.



It was further determined that the Home Front Command only conducted inspections of schools and kindergartens in **Ashkelon**, **Giv'atayim**, and **Holon** after October 7, 2023, and did not perform inspections in **Gilboa** or **Bi'na** during the years 2021 to 2023.



Multi-Year Plan Addressing Home Front Emergency Preparedness – In order to implement the "Northern Shield" plan³, the Home Front Command was allocated a budget amounting to NIS 1.406 billion for the years 2019–2024, with NIS 869 million budgeted in the year 2024, following the onset of the Swords of Iron War (only 21% was budgeted prior to the beginning of the war). This was the case notwithstanding the fact that, as stipulated in Resolution B/302 of the State Security Cabinet, an allocation of NIS 3 billion was required during this timeframe (NIS 500 million annually). Furthermore, it has been observed that the actual implementation of the allocated budgets by the conclusion of 2024 amounted to only NIS 733.69 million, representing approximately 52% of the total budget that was allocated. It is pertinent to note that this figure reflects payments made by July 2025 and does not encompass additional budgetary obligations that remain unrealized in terms of payment. Additionally, it should be emphasized that a previous report issued in 2020 by the State Comptroller highlighted that Cabinet Resolution B/302 was adopted without the provision of budgetary sources pursuant to the Budget Foundations Law, 1985, thus rendering its implementation questionable.



Government Resolutions Concerning Assistance in the Protection of Ashkelon – In the years 2022 and 2023, government ministries allocated a total of NIS 12.63 million to the **Ashkelon** Municipality, as delineated in Government Resolution 1278, from an overall budget specified in the government resolution of NIS 21 million (representing 60%). Notably, only NIS 2.7 million of the allocated amount were disbursed (21%). This underutilization can be attributed to the failure to utilize a budget of NIS 4 million earmarked for the renovation of public shelters between July 2023 and June 2024, coupled with delays and procrastination in the management of the Municipality's protection projects.



Assistance from the Ministry of Construction and Housing to Ashkelon Residents for the Construction of Apartment Protected Spaces – It was not until June 2023, approximately one year and three months after the publication of Government Resolution 1278, that the Ministry of Housing published a procedure enabling the receipt of grants and loans as stipulated by the resolution. Consequently, the budget of NIS 56 million for the year 2022 and the budget of NIS 50 million for 2023, as outlined in the government resolution, could not be utilized until mid-2023. Due to the extended nature of the proceedings, the intended purpose of the assistance was ultimately not achieved, resulting in only one beneficiary applying for the assistance from July 2023 to September 2024, thereby receiving a grant of NIS 158,000 out of the NIS 50 million allocated in the government resolution for that year.

³

Resolution B/302 of the Ministerial Committee for National Security Affairs "Home Front Preparedness for Emergency Situations" from July 16, 2018 to establish an inter-ministerial team to formulate a multi-year plan for the years 2019–2030 for protecting the home front and improving earthquake preparedness in the amount of NIS 5 billion.

**The Process of Terminating the Operation of a Dedicated Situation Room for Arab Society –**

Approximately ten days following the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, the Ministry of Social Equality, through the Authority for the Economic Development of the Minority Sector, established a situation room aimed at assisting Arab society and addressing the immediate social and community needs that arose due to the onset of the war. In May 2024, the Minister of Social Equality opted not to extend the contract for the operation of the situation room. The audit revealed that in the emergency situation engendered by the Swords of Iron War, no existent entity had been identified for the purpose of fulfilling the functions performed by the situation room for Arab society and providing an appropriate response in an expedient manner. However, given that the purpose of establishing the situation room was to function as "a center for information, reporting, guidance, and assistance to Arab society, in full compliance with changing conditions and the directives of the Home Front Command and other competent authorities during times of emergency" – coupled with the ongoing warfare and the establishment of a wartime routine alongside additional responses in this regard – it was later deemed unnecessary to continue the activity of the situation room. Nonetheless, it would have been prudent for the Ministry of Social Equality's management to consult various bodies it believed to be capable of providing the necessary response to Arab society during emergencies prior to making the decision to close the situation room, and to solicit their perspectives on this matter.



Public (Mass) Shelters – It is commendable that the local authorities of **Giv'atayim** and **Holon** have prepared appropriate mass shelters and have prepared a corresponding "mass shelter file".

Conducting Inspections of Public Shelters by the Local Authorities – The **Giv'atayim** Municipality undertakes inspections of the maintenance of public shelters within its jurisdiction on a quarterly basis.

Allocation of Protection Grants to Residents of the Conflict Line Settlements in the North by the Ministry of Construction and Housing – The scope of the Ministry of Housing's protection grants to residents of the conflict line in the north increased from NIS 8.2 to 11.1 million, representing a growth of 35% between 2021 and 2022, and further increased to NIS 11.4 million in 2023, with the aid budget being fully utilized.

Key Recommendations



It is advisable that subsequent to the formulation of the updated protection concept and the dissemination of the revised guidelines to local authorities, the Home Front Command undertake a review and approval process for local authorities' protection plans (TAMIR), with the aim of ensuring that local authorities adequately prepare for protection of their populations in alignment with the established guidelines. The Bi'na Local Council and the Gilboa Regional Council are required to develop a local protection plan in accordance with the specifications set forth in the master file for local authorities and the master file for regional councils; furthermore, the Ashkelon Municipality is tasked with mapping its population and addressing the protection deficiencies within its jurisdiction.



In light of the absence of protective measures for the Bedouin areas in the Negev and the vulnerability of this demographic to missile impacts, it is recommended that the Bedouin Settlement Authority, in collaboration with the Home Front Command, devise a comprehensive strategy for the protection of the Bedouin areas. This plan should encompass an updated assessment of the unrecognized settlements and propose suitable protective solutions. Such a strategy will assist decision-makers in budgeting various protective measures in accordance with operational assessments and security requirements. Additionally, it is imperative to continue efforts to encourage the transition of residents to recognized and regulated settlements, wherein protected spaces can be constructed.



To ensure the structural integrity of shelters within residential apartment buildings and their appropriateness for use during emergencies, the municipalities of Ashkelon, Giv'atayim, and Holon should enhance their inspections and enforcement activities in regard to the maintenance of communal shelters during both routine and emergency periods. Given the limited number of inspections currently performed by local authorities regarding shelter upkeep, it is advisable for the Home Front Command to intensify its engagement with local authorities, ensuring that periodic inspections of shelters in residential apartment buildings are conducted consistently per the established work plan. Furthermore, it is recommended that the Home Front Command oversee and supervise the actions of local authorities concerning the execution of its guidelines in this domain.



Considering the inadequate condition of public shelters in Israel (approximately one-fifth are classified as either of low suitability, or unfit), and the necessity to guarantee their adequacy and accessibility during emergencies, it is recommended that the Home Front Command enhance supervision and

regulation of local authorities pertaining to public shelter maintenance. This should involve the establishment of explicit enforcement mechanisms to ensure the suitability of such shelters.




The Ashkelon Municipality and the Gilboa Regional Council should conduct regular inspections of the maintenance status of public shelters under their jurisdiction and document the outcomes of these inspections. Additionally, the municipalities of Ashkelon and Giv'atayim, and the Gilboa Regional Council must rectify the deficiencies present in shelters and protected spaces within educational institutions under their purview. The Home Front Command must ensure that assessments of the suitability of shelters in educational institutions within local authorities are conducted consistently.



The State Security Cabinet's Resolution B/302 ("Northern Shield") was adopted without the allocation of financial resources as stipulated by the Budget Foundations Law, 1985. Up until the onset of the war, only 21% of the budgetary amount specified in the resolution had been allocated. The head of the Budget Division in the Ministry of Finance and the Director General of the Ministry of Defense are obligated to identify an appropriate budgetary source for the full execution of the plan in order to address the protection deficiencies, particularly in localities adjacent to the fence.



To streamline the various procedures associated with establishing conditions for obtaining loans and grants aimed at facilitating housing protection solutions in future comparable scenarios, it is recommended that the Ministries of Housing and Finance conduct a lessons-learned exercise concerning the procedures for receiving grants and loans. Moreover, the necessary procedures for implementing the government resolution should be published in proximity to the date of the government's announcement.

Current Status of Protection for Israeli Residents, by Type of Protective Measure, January 2025 (Numbers and Percentages)

According to Home Front Command data, processed by the Office of the State Comptroller.

Summary

The establishment of physical protection measures to safeguard the entire population of the State of Israel constitutes a fundamental prerequisite for addressing the threats posed by missiles and rockets. In addition to enhancing the safety of the population, such measures facilitate the maintenance of a routine and the provision of essential services to residents during periods of emergency. This report has identified significant disparities between the protection requirements and the actual conditions on the ground, which stem from a shortage of protected spaces and inadequate maintenance of both public and private shelters. As of January 2025, approximately 3.2 million residents (33.6%) lack standard protective measures. Of particular concern is the notable absence of protection measures in the Bedouin areas in the Negev, where standard shelters or protective provisions are unavailable during emergencies.

The report further indicates that the municipalities of Ashkelon, Giv'atayim, and Holon failed to conduct inspections of shelters in residential apartment buildings with the necessary frequency, and in those instances where inspections were carried out, not all required assessments in accordance with shelter maintenance guidelines were performed. Consequently, numerous shelters were rendered unsuitable for use at the onset of the military conflict, prompting the Ministry of Housing to initiate the allocation of substantial funds to local authorities for the purpose of making shelters in residential apartment buildings usable.

The local authorities examined, including the municipalities of Ashkelon, Giv'atayim, and Holon, the Bi'na Local Council, and the Gilboa Regional Council, are required to complete the mapping of protected areas and update the local protection plan to address identified gaps. They should employ a geographic information system to effectively map and manage relevant information, as well as enhance the maintenance of existing shelters. It is imperative for the local authorities to maintain vigilant oversight of the condition of communal shelters within residential apartment buildings and to ensure that residents uphold proper maintenance standards.

In light of the findings obtained from the inspection of public shelters within the local authorities examined, it is recommended that the Home Front Command augment the frequency of its inspections to guarantee adherence by local authorities to the established guidelines and requirements.

To obtain an accurate assessment of the protective gaps in educational institutions, the Ministry of Education must continually update data concerning protected spaces within such institutions. The Ministry of Education, in conjunction with the Home Front Command and the Ministry of Finance, must collaborate to implement updated regulatory protection measures for educational facilities, informed by the insights garnered from the Swords of Iron War.

The deficiencies in governmental responses to the emergency needs of Arab society highlight the necessity for the Prime Minister's Office, in partnership with the Ministry of Social Equality, to establish a coordinating body capable of engaging governmental ministries, local authorities, and pertinent public entities to address the shortcomings in civil emergency preparedness, with a view to mitigate potential harm to civilians arising from military conflict.

To facilitate the enactment of the "Northern Shield" plan, the Home Front Command was allocated a budget of NIS 1.406 billion for the years 2019–2024, including NIS 869 million designated for 2024, following the onset of the Swords of Iron War. Notably, according to Resolution B/302, NIS 3 billion were mandated to be allocated during this timeframe for the effective implementation of the plan. Moreover, it appears that the actual utilization of the allocated budgets by the end of 2024 totaled only NIS 733.69 million, representing approximately 52% of the total budget that was allocated. It is important to recognize that this figure reflects payments made as of July 2025 and does not encompass additional budgetary commitments that have yet to be fulfilled through payment.

The inter-ministerial team, led by the National Security Council, must complete its examination of existing gaps and devise a budgeted multi-year plan, in coordination with the head of the Budget Division at the Ministry of Finance and the Director General of the Ministry of Defense, with a focus on addressing protection deficiencies in areas along conflict lines in both the north and south, with the aim of presenting this plan to the Cabinet.

It is recommended that the Prime Minister raise the issue of protection gaps for renewed deliberation in the Cabinet and pursue the formulation of a budgeted national plan to provide the requisite response, as well as to work toward institutionalizing mechanisms for the systematic monitoring and follow-up of the plan's implementation.